

THIRD CONFERENCE

on the

PATHOGENESIS

of

WAR

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The Medical Association for the Prevention of War held its third scientific conference on the Pathogenesis of War at Selwyn College, Cambridge, in July, 1963. An outline of the proceedings appeared in the *Lancet* of 3rd August, 1963. Ten of the papers read at the meetings are presented here.

The first conference (Cambridge, 1961), was reported in abstract in the *Lancet* of 27th July, 1961. Reference was made to the second conference (Oxford, 1962), in the *Lancet* of 28th July, 1962, and the full texts of the papers were published in book form by H. K. Lewis and Co. Ltd. in 1963, under the title *Pathogenesis of War* (price 10/6).

The editor wishes to thank all the contributors to this symposium and also Dr. C. F. Rycroft and Dr. R. E. W. Fisher who unfortunately did not complete the MSS. of their lecture notes. Thanks are also due to the chairmen of the conference sessions—Prof. O. L. Zangwill, Prof. Martin Roth, Prof. J. S. Mitchell, Dr. Alice Stewart, Lord McNair and Prof. L. S. Penrose.

INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS

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A third conference on the Pathogenesis of War was necessary because of the complexity and extent of the problem. Many different disciplines are required to contribute towards a solution and this approach has been a notable feature of M.A.P.W. conferences. The problem of war and its causation has to be examined scientifically and the beginnings of such an approach are now evident in the Pugwash conferences, also in the establishments of research centres which would investigate the causes and prevention of conflict in Canada, U.S.A., Norway, Japan, and Britain. Misinformation is far too prevalent, leading to exaggerated maladaptive responses ; it has to be replaced with accurate information which could lead to the development of wider loyalties. It has required the intensive pressures of the nuclear age to enforce a reconsideration of the conduct of international relations, but this is a sensible and reasonable reaction to a fear which is healthy and well founded. Other fears are prevalent, less well-substantiated, which generate hatred and are conducive to outbreaks of violence ; here the psychiatrist's help is essential. We are concerned with violence in its most extreme form but have to bear in mind that it is the end-product of pathological thinking; the formative influences and pre-disposing conditions have to be elucidated. War is pathological but it is the expression of a sickness in human society itself which arises from the cherishing of ideas hurtful to the general welfare of mankind.

Certainly there would seem to be something unhealthy in a world where the nations, whose civilisations are the most advanced, set such a disagreeable example in the conduct of international affairs and largely sidestep the responsibilities which rightly should accompany their economic pre-eminence. To overcome these limitations we have to raise the level of our appreciation of the major issues confronting us. As Dr. Brock Chisholm has pointed out, tragedy could be prevented if enough people in the more privileged countries saw the truth sufficiently vividly to break out of the anachronisms of their own societies, with their limited loyalties and easy dependence upon obsolete ideas, and accepted personal responsibility for the destructive crisis which threatened humanity. Now there is no chance whatever of muddling through or fighting it out ; this time we have to think our way out—and do it beforehand. Mistrust between nations is a crux. In securing a solution to the problem of war the methods of science and reason, the most powerful tools available to men, should be used. The imperative need is for a great multi-disciplinary effort.

THE INFLUENCE OF EDUCATIONAL FACTORS ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS WAR

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In much of the discussion on the nature and causes of war undue emphasis seems to have been placed in the past on adult thoughts and actions. Since, in fact, it is invariably given to adults to generate and initiate wars, this must seem to many an eminently sensible approach, but it is likely that at least some of the mainsprings of war lie at a far deeper level. They may have their origin, indeed, in the nascent personality of childhood. This is by no means an original thesis, but it seems that many of its implications have largely been ignored. UNESCO, for example, has declared that " wars are born in the minds of men." It might equally appropriately have been asserted that " wars are born in the minds of children " or at least in the basic structure of their personalities. If there is any truth in this assertion then clearly it has enormous importance for those charged with the task of ministering to the young. It is extremely important, for example, for the parental role, since in cultures such as ours parents will probably continue to be the people most likely to influence children deeply and permanently. But it has almost equal importance for professional educators, especially teachers, who, after parents, undoubtedly exercise the strongest influence on growing children. The matter, too, is bound to be of special interest to social psychologists and psychiatrists, many of whom have long recognised that the factor of abnormal personality is an important element in the causation of war. The contention of this paper, briefly, is that if we can isolate and modify those factors of childhood which tend later to promote warlike attitudes we may have gone some way to preventing the incidence of war. The contention is, further, that this involves the promotion of healthy and mature personality development in children and that this is the main task and end of the educational process.

There can be little doubt that most educators, certainly in Britain, would subscribe wholeheartedly to such an ideal. Most of them acknowledge that their function is to provide those opportunities for the growing child which will lead to its full development physically, mentally, morally and spiritually. They see this exemplified in the drawing out and fostering of all the latent gifts and talents their children may possess, and in this way they believe they can achieve the optimum development we have spoken of. Unfortunately, in any culture, but more particularly, I believe, in our own, there is often a vast difference between the stated ideal and the end-product of the educational

process. This is not necessarily the fault of the teachers, but many of them soon become aware that there are major issues involved in the achievement of such an ideal—issues involving forces actively inimical to it and requiring great moral courage on their part to face and resolve. In short, the educational ideal professed by many teachers is both thwarted, and to some extent rendered impossible of achievement, because of certain external factors and pressures basically opposed to it. Teachers may often be unconscious of such pressures ; sometimes they may even agree with them (this is usually the easiest way out of their moral dilemma), but rarely do they see, in all its stark reality, the contradiction which is posed by postulating, on the one hand, children growing up at peace with themselves and incapable of accepting war as an answer to international problems and, on the other, the conditions and pressures of the everyday world existing around them which exert powerful educational influences in the opposite direction. These influences provide the back-drop against which the teacher must work. They also represent farces which must be combated actively if an anti-war climate of opinion is to be established. For this reason, it might be worthwhile trying to isolate some of them for the purpose of analysis and discussion.

Very broadly speaking, the forces which militate against the full and healthy personality development of children in respect of peaceful attitudes can be grouped under two headings : first, the nature of the culture-pattern and the socialisation process ; second, the nature of the educational system, including that of the teacher. The second is really dependent upon the first, of which it is actually an aspect. Socialisation is a term used by cultural anthropologists and social psychologists to denote that process in any culture whereby the young, in addition to being nurtured and protected, are inducted into the culture by learning the culture-pattern, so that they may grow up responsible and acceptable members of it. During the process of growing up this involves the acceptance of the customs and traditions of the group, knowing its prejudices and taboos, obeying its laws and learning the roles appropriate for different people and occasions, so that society may function adequately and satisfactorily. These roles include, for example, those which might apply to a boy or a girl, a man or a woman, a dustman or a duke, a doctor or his patient, a theatre nurse or a surgeon, and so on. Only when these customs, traditions, prejudices and roles have been fully learnt and accepted does society consider the growing person fit to be admitted as one of its adult members. In our society this is signified by the power to vote at the age of twenty one years. In other words, the growing person is gradually equipped with a complete stock of cultural stereotypes upon which he can draw

to pattern his own behaviour, to judge the behaviour of others or to meet the contingencies of any practical situation he may be likely to encounter. He has, in short, become a social being fit to live with his fellow-men, recognising his obligations and responsibilities towards society and aware of himself as a member of his cultural group. Much of the process of socialisation is carried out in early childhood by the family, but from the age of five to fifteen years (the age of compulsory schooling for all children in this country) this becomes principally the task of the educational system. In some cases, such as those of pupils who attend grammar or public schools, the range may be much longer and for many others besides, the process is carried on by institutions of further education.

The process of socialisation is important for our discussion for a number of reasons. In the first place, a great deal of it is carried out by the formal educational system acting as society's delegate, charged with the task of ensuring that an acceptable type of citizen shall be produced. The cultural stereotypes with which the child is endowed are, therefore, essentially images of what society deems appropriate for its welfare, and the instruments for promoting these images are chiefly the teachers. The latter are thus in an immensely powerful educative position. If we do not like or wish to accept these cultural stereotypes, or if we wish in any way to modify child personality. For change our culture-pattern or society, then it is to the teachers and the schools that we have to turn as likely to be of the greatest assistance to us.

But the socialisation process is also important for another reason. In general, children do not behave naturally as social beings. They have to be coaxed, cajoled, threatened, and if necessary, forced to accept the social roles expected of them. For example, they have to be weaned and toilet-trained. They have to learn to eat in a socially-approved manner. They have to control their sex instincts ; they have to cultivate appropriate modes of behaviour towards their parents, their teachers, towards strangers, the opposite sex, even towards themselves. These things do not come naturally to them, and because they do not they are resented. Because they are resented, they inevitably create frustration and the natural outlet of frustration is aggression. Thus tension and aggression become endemic in our culture. To some extent it becomes so in all cultures, but particularly in our own. It is fair to say that growing up in any civilised community like our own is far more frustrating than it is for children growing up in more primitive communities. The latter provide many compensations for frustration, but in highly urbanised industrialised Western society there are few compensations for frustrated ego-fulfilment and scant opportunities for ego-

satisfaction. Thus life for children — as also for adults — in a community like ours often involves a continual series of frustrating situations leading naturally to the build-up of aggressive feeling and behaviour. This is particularly marked, of course, during the period of adolescence. The important point to be emphasised here, however, is that frustration, and therefore aggression, are endemic and natural in our culture. They are part of us, part of our very way of life, and are likely to become more pronounced as the pace of social and technological change increases. We cannot escape from them ; we have to live with them ; we have to come to terms with them.

There are two important consequences of this fact for attitudes towards war. First, frustration and aggression need to be dealt with consciously in our culture if they are not to build up destructively and finally play their part in the expression of warlike attitudes. Second, unless they are dealt with adequately, they will continue to turn outwards in the form of hostility towards the out-group. A well-known paradox exists in this respect: that peace in the in-group can only exist at the expense of hostility towards the out-group. The problem of an adequate solution to the question of aggression is therefore a major educational issue, and dealing with it can prove a major contribution on the part of education towards world peace.

At the risk of boring you, may I take the matter a little further? One is impressed these days by the number of thinking people who, drawing a causal connection between aggression and war, have therefore believed that to abolish war it is necessary first to abolish aggression. We have seen that modern life is a long series of frustrating situations leading to the build-up of aggressive feelings in individuals and groups as a whole, and hence, to aggressive behaviour. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that a solution to the problem lies along these lines. We cannot appreciably change life, nor can we to any extent succeed in abolishing its frustrating situations. We have, therefore, to learn to live with frustration and aggression, but to channel them to less deadly ends than those of war. From a philosophical point of view I am not at all sure that it would be a good thing if we could abolish them entirely. Struggle and conflict are of the nature of life and being. To be is to struggle. Out of struggle have been born man's greatest achievements. Any doctor will testify to the strength of the will to live, or to the strength of the life-force as a positive manifestation of the human organism. He could also testify that in disease, with the absence of struggle or the will to live, the organism expresses a contrary tendency. This, surely, is the story of evolution ; it is also the story of ourselves and our daily lives. The answer to frustration and aggression, therefore, cannot be their abolition completely, but

rather to teach people how to live with them—to live, in fact with tension and conflict—but to direct their aggressive drives to positive, creative and constructive ends rather than destructive ones. Clearly, one is speaking here of what the psychologist would term sublimation and the psychiatrist would probably refer to as displacement or catharsis. Perhaps the most important function of education today is to prepare children for such a life of conflict, to give them the means of dealing with their aggressive tendencies, and to teach them to channel these to the creative and constructive ends we have spoken of.

The third conditioning factor arising from the process of socialisation and affecting attitudes towards war is that which is known as sex-typing. In all cultures certain roles are expected of boys and girls, as also of men and women. These male and female roles naturally differ significantly, for basically they are geared to biological differences. They are also geared to the ultimate part each sex is likely to play in society and particularly in parenthood. Boys, for example, are taught that it is unmanly to cry, though girls and Sir Winston Churchill may do so. Boys may fight with boys, but never with girls. A girl mustn't be boyish or else she is a "Tomboy," but even this is not as derisive a term as that of "Sissie" applied to a boy who affects some female attribute. One could go on endlessly to draw these sex-role differences, but there is neither the time nor the necessity to do so here. Obviously, sex-typing is necessary if only for biological purposes, but the important thing in our culture is that the male role has traditionally been impregnated heavily with attitudes towards war which do not basically form an essential part of it. These attributes are, however, linked with the traditional defence role of the male, but on to this have been grafted others pertaining to the group in its traditional role of hostility to others. Thus aggression towards the out-group, or in its extreme form—war, has always been presented as an honourable and patriotic duty; it has been surrounded with the qualities of glory, honour, adventure and enhanced self-esteem which few spirited boys find it within themselves to resist. As John Rae points out in a recent publication: "War is a virile industry ; it has many by-products and one of these . . . is the corruption of children." He believes that the three most dangerous myths current about war when he was a boy during the Second World were: first, that violence was not only justified but laudable; second, that war was fun, a great game; and third, that physical courage was the finest virtue and that moral courage as shown, for example, by the conscientious objector or, in another situation, by Pastor Niemoller, was contemptible. Above all he says, violence in the male role was glorified. It is easy to see the connection between what he says and the roles which our culture demands of its

young. But it would be a mistake to believe that they are new as attributes in our society they are as old as our history itself. But whereas the invention of the bullet which could pierce knightly armour was probably the first major contribution towards destroying the idea that war was a game, it has been left to atomic war as possible in our own day to explode the myth completely. No one in his senses, not by any stretch of the imagination, could possibly believe atomic warfare to be a game, nor is it easy to see in what ways the manly virtues of courage, chivalry and honour might be associated with it. Young people today realise acutely now outmoded in the modern world are these traditional stereotypes of the sex roles, more particularly that of the male. They realise that atomic warfare is no respecter of sex differences, but that, if anything, it falls more heavily on the female rather than the male, since it affects not only her, but also her progeny and the future of the race.

But there is a special reason, I believe, why we need consciously to re-appraise the roles of the sexes in our culture. Materially, they are already out-of-date, for women as well as—men are now breadwinners, racing drivers, business and professional people, politicians, even cosmonauts. Women have infiltrated increasingly into walks of life previously dominated by men and this process is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, the balance has long needed redressing for in Western civilisation generally the male dominance of our culture cannot be unconnected with the great incidence in it of war also. At a depth level, these male and female roles have to a large extent been reflected in our personality type, where the male component has similarly exercised a predominant influence. Surely, it is time that the female component of personality should be given more opportunity to develop. Have we not allowed too much rein to our maleness, with its primeval forces of sex, survival and aggression, and have we not tended to devalue the female attribute of personality in terms of its intuition, sensibility, protectiveness, understanding, love and consciousness •of beauty? I take this again to be a major responsibility for our educational system. I believe that with an evolving and redressed balance in human personality in our culture we can influence attitudes towards war profoundly. But it is an enormous undertaking ; so enormous, indeed, that we can ill afford to delay any longer in setting about the task involved.

Before turning to deal more specifically with the education system, may I deal first with one further aspect of our culture which seems to me to be of the utmost potency in producing complacent attitudes towards war, especially amongst the younger generation. I refer to what are known as mass-media of communication, namely, those organs of mass education, or mis-

education as they sometimes turn out to be, such as the cinema, television, radio and cheap mass reading material usually of juvenile nature as, for example, certain types of comics a but particularly certain short, illustrated magazines produced specially for boys. Because of their mass approach these organs have an enormous educational power and are also a powerful instrument in conditioning people to the norms of a .mass culture in which war is accepted as a solution to certain international problems. No. one can fail to be impressed with the rapid rise in recent years of films (especially American films) on war subjects, Often these do not overtly glorify war but they portray it more insidiously as an element bringing out the finest in man. They recognise the justice and validity of killing one's fellowmen, and they present war as a great adventure. Rarely do they portray, other than occasionally and even then in perfunctory form, the human misery and widespread suffering of war. Much the same can be said of many war novels, but in general at least they make a greater attempt to be realistic about the true nature of their subject. The really horrible little publications are those small magazines, consisting entirely of pictures with text underneath, directed wholly at boys and setting out deliberately to build an image of war which can only be described as glamorous, adventurous, exciting and fine. War is deliberately portrayed as the grand adventure. Radio and television must also accept some blame in connection with these adverse attitudes, but they do not compare in any way with those wretched little magazines.

Please forgive me if I have dealt at length with the cultural forces and societal pressures inimical to the establishment of an anti-war climate of opinion. I have done so partly because they do not seem to me to be well known and also because they exercise a deep influence on the educational system, since they serve to reinforce the cultural stereotypes inherited from the past. In connection with the educational system there appear to be three aspects particularly which bear upon our discussion : first, the nature of the system itself, especially in the light of its origins and its inheritance from the past ; second, its present curriculum content and organisation ; third, the nature of the teachers whose task it is to interpret the system to the younger generation. In the first place, our national system of education came into being in 1870, when compulsory elementary education (as it was then termed) was introduced into this country for the first time. We were by no means the first in Europe to take such a step ; indeed, many other European countries had already established national systems of education before us. Many of them perhaps the outstanding example is Germany had realised the essential part such a national system had to play in developing a national consciousness and a patriotic allegiance to the nation-state. This

was also true in England. Queen Victoria had been on the throne for 33 years ; England was assembling one of the greatest empires the world has ever known ; the grab for Africa was about to take place; we were gaining many possessions in the Far East; some of what are now the older Dominions were being settled. Above all, the Industrial Revolution had reached its peak and the population was expanding at a very fast rate. There was an intense consciousness of England's destiny and a sense of nationalism which sometimes verged on the rabid. Patriotic songs of the period like, " Soldiers of the Queen " and " Rule Britannia " well express the national mood. The " white man's burden " was no empty phrase, even if occasionally it meant no more than an excuse for aggressive aggrandisement. On the home front, many thousands of idle, semi-starved, ill-shod and ill-clothed urchins roamed the streets of the new industrial towns and cities, creating a social problem of the first order. It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that one of the main purposes of the new education system was seen to be that of civilising this new and growing lower-class child proletariat. " We must educate our masters " someone said cynically in the House of Commons when the new Bill was being debated, but there was also fear behind that remark. What was more natural than that " civilisation " should be construed largely in terms of the dominant cultural stereotypes of the times images of the new role of the Englishman abroad and of the glory of England's destiny? Only in this way could the frustration and aggression generated by the Industrial Revolution be diverted successfully to the out-group. Peace at home was possible only through channelling aggression outwards. In this hey-day of Britain's greatness, undimmed until after the First World War, it became vitally necessary to propagate such stereotypes and the task of doing so was given mainly to the new education system. We still have many of these with us today but only recently have we begun to question seriously the validity of most of them in an atomic age.

Naturally, the nature of our education system was, and still is, reflected in its curricula and organisation. Perhaps its most marked feature was the arrogant nineteenth century materialism which has since persisted and deepened. It was inevitable that in the process this should lead to a devaluation of the aesthetic and spiritual aspects of child development. By the 1940's the latter especially had worried so many people in Britain that a determined attempt to rectify it was made in the 1944 Education Act. It is the opinion of many people that this came too late and may not, therefore, succeed. Can it be that we chose to ignore those sides of our children's personalities because we were aware unconsciously that they were essentially non-materialist and non-violent? Or because they did not fit in with the

traditional stereotypes we had learnt to admire and respect? The point that needs emphasising here is that young children naturally have a spiritual awareness and a sense of unity with the cosmos and their fellow-men. There is no colour-bar amongst children, nor hatred of others simply on the grounds of different nationality. But we allowed these aesthetic and spiritual qualities to decay progressively because we realised, again perhaps unconsciously, that they are inimical to the growth of strong national in-group sentiment and solidarity. How different is the approach in some Buddhist temple schools, where even children of six years of age are taught the art of contemplation so that they may grow in spiritual awareness and wisdom. They also become by nature non-aggressive by so doing.

Unfortunately, there is only time here to deal with one aspect of the curriculum, but it is one which probably has more to do with the formation of attitudes towards peace and war than any other. I refer to the teaching of history and to a lesser extent the same may apply to the teaching of literature. Because history is so largely the story of people and events in the past it is therefore very closely connected with the matter of cultural stereotypes. Indeed, it is the principal medium through which such stereotypes acceptable to the in-group or the nation-state are propagated. Bertrand Russell has pointed out that Sir Francis Drake is so portrayed in English history books that he inevitably becomes every schoolboy's hero. But a very different picture of him appears in de Madariaga's *Rise of the Spanish American Empire* where El Draco is a villainous, barbarous cutthroat without peer. As with people, so with events. The Battle of Jutland in the First World War is still claimed as a victory by both British and German historians. And one could cite many other examples of a similar nature. Juno has shown that all groups have need of their myths and that myth-making is a natural phenomenon. occurring at an unconscious level it is largely through its interpretation of its past that a group projects its idealised image of itself, in the process often making mountains out of molehills and giants out of dwarfs. For our purposes here, it is useful to note that an inability to resolve aggressive drives plays an important part in the nature of myths and cultural stereotypes and highlights the fact that our problem is not one which concerns only consciousness, but is one also which has deeper aspects much more difficult to probe not to say, however, that there is not a very great deal that can be done with the reform and reinterpretation of history syllabuses, particularly in the teaching of history. As you may well know, UNESCO is actively concerned with this problem. In the organization of education one fatal weakness of our early system, which for a long time we continue to inherit slav-

ishiy, was its conception of education as mere schooling and the implanting of information and knowledge—the pouring of these into empty vessels represented by pupils' heads. For this purpose we built monolithic school buildings surrounded by high walls and often surmounted by barbed wire or broken glass. It was in such buildings that we confined the unruly, recalcitrant child population which was to be "civilised." These gaunt buildings, regrettably, many of them are still in use today. Today, and, still dominate the skyline of many British towns and cities however, cynics suggest that whereas the high, protective walls were once designed to keep pupils in, they now serve the purpose of keeping parents out! The effect we inherited of confining education to four brick walls was, in my view, disastrous, for far from diminishing frustration it served to enhance it. Even worse, it gave us a conception of education which was woefully erroneous. Today we no longer believe that education is concerned solely with the imparting of information, but rather the living and gaining of experiences. With younger children especially, there is an increasing tendency to forsake the brick walls for reality outside, whether in the form of studies of the environment, visits to community institutions or organisations or visits to other countries, and so on. But we have by no means wholly emancipated ourselves from this strait-jacket conception of education and one has only to view the rebellion against school of many teen-agers to understand the frustration and boredom it produces in so many of them. This subject is so important for our discussion that I shall return to it later.

And finally, the teachers. Perhaps you will permit me, as a member of the profession myself, to pay tribute here to this vitally important body of people. I wish to do so particularly because I would not like any of the remarks I may make in a moment to be misunderstood, or in any way construed as a denigration of this dedicated profession. We noted earlier that frustration and aggression were endemic in our culture; we noted, too, that the problem of finding an adequate solution to them was a major educational issue which might have important consequences for world peace. Yet helping children to deal with their own aggressive tendencies is surely an aspect of healthy personality development as a whole, which is the accepted aim of most teachers. We must therefore make the assumption that the latter are in fact, capable of helping children in this way. Thank Heaven, many of them are, but they are so in spite of the system which produces them and not because of it. The building of healthy personalities in children presupposes the existence of mature personalities in those whose task it is to help them. But can we honestly say that all teachers, even the majority, have themselves come to terms with their aggressive tendencies, or

themselves have developed maturely as people? This is in no sense to blame the teachers if we answer in the negative, but to criticise the way in which selection for teaching is made. The essential qualification for entrance to the profession, at least where state teachers are concerned, is an academic one, namely, at least 5 passes at " O " level in the General Certificate of Education. Subject to this, there is afterwards an interview in which it is true, an attempt is made to assess vocational interest in the profession and also to ascertain whether the candidate has a suitable type of personality for teaching. But although interviewing may often reflect a high degree of skill there must be occasions when it proves a very hit-and-miss affair. In some of the Scandinavian countries and parts of the U.S.A. personality tests and ratings are an essential part of the process for selection for teaching. Without the aid of these, prolonged and depth interviewing may give more reliable data on personality suitability than at present obtains, but for this, of course, there is usually available neither the time nor suitably trained personnel. In any case, owing to the depressed status of the teaching profession (we are rated, for example, in no way as highly as the medical profession !) and the rising post-war child population, we are perennially short of teachers. Candidates for the teaching profession, provided they have the minimum academic qualifications, usually find themselves in a seller's market." All comers are welcome. Moreover, when once they have entered training courses for the profession the Ministry of Education naturally tends to frown upon their failing, since, of course, it pays the grants which makes such training possible. It is also very conscious of the acute need for the services of the teachers in the schools. Only the really hopeless, therefore, are eliminated from the profession. I am not suggesting for a moment that all candidates for the teaching profession should undergo a process of analysis—though in a perfect society they might well have to do so ! but I am certainly contending that it is idle to speak of helping children to develop harmonious personalities or deal successfully with their aggressive tendencies until their teachers have themselves reached that degree of maturity.

What, then, can education do to influence attitudes towards war? It seems to me that there are three main ways in which it can make a great contribution to the development of young people along the lines we have been discussing. In the first place, it must clearly try to deal more constructively with the problem of aggression and aggressive tendencies. Secondly, it must seek more actively to broaden the horizons of young people towards the ideal of world peace and international understanding. Thirdly, wherever possible, it must seek to ensure that teachers are better informed, better-trained and are made more aware of

the problems of personality development, especially in terms of infantile projection, both in relationship to themselves and to their pupils. I would like to deal with the first two of these suggestions in rather more detail.

First, the problem of aggression: it seems to me that school education today does not nearly extend our children enough in the direction of their developing vigorous, healthy personalities capable to some extent of sublimating their aggressive tendencies. We have tended far too much to confine education rigidly to the four walls of the classroom, so that in essence we have taken the salt out of it. Very many adolescent children today tend to become unutterably bored with school; they cannot get away from it quickly enough. School neither holds them nor interests them because it doesn't extend them as they need to be extended. The sense of adventure and the element of glory which is so necessary for the healthy development of all of us is too often absent from education. In his Reith Lectures Bertrand Russell speaks of an old Red Indian chief who was asked which he preferred—the old way of life with its constant wars, insecurity and danger, or the present-day peaceful life in the reserves, with the oversight of a benevolent government and the Pax Americana. Without hesitation the old man replied that he preferred the old days. When his puzzled questioner asked him why this was so, he answered: " Because there was glory in it! " Surely there is a lesson here for education? Don't we, in some measure, all have this need for self-enhancement and ego-fulfilment? Surely this is an essential element for growth in children and adults alike? Somehow, somewhere, we have to put this quality back into education today.

Of course, there have been conscious attempts in the past by some progressive school to do just this. During the 1930's Ernest Westlake started the Forest School in the New Forest where children spent a great deal of their time out-of-doors, camping, logging, climbing, collecting, and so on. Westlake believed in the recapitulation theory of child development and he recognised the essential need of children at different ages for activities of this nature. Those who know of his work, both for children and young people, recognise that he supplied an ingredient in child education which was eminently satisfying both for pupils and teachers, but which is largely missing today. Though they do so for what is apparently a different reason, namely, character and leadership training, the Outward Bound schools also supply this essential ingredient of adventure and extension of personality. Many other schools have also tried similar approaches my complaint against them is that they have been too concerned with freedom and not enough with challenge, not recognising that the latter is a condition of the former, especially

in respect of healthy personality. But it is only in ways such as these that we can put back the salt, into education and heir pupils, through challenge and the spirit of adventure, to deal with their aggressive tendencies and the problem of latent aggression.

We have to deal, secondly, with the problem in education of parochialism and a narrow nationalism. Nationalism in its best and proper sense is not a dishonourable word; it can be a fine and honourable one. It only becomes bad when it is restrictive, exclusive, or when man makes it the excuse for aggression against his fellow-man. Basically, nationalism is only " groupness " which is an essential element of our being; we need the differences of all our cultures to make a rich pool of world culture. But it is this " other-regarding " side of nationalism that we need to emphasise, this need for international understanding. We must encourage this in every way, by foreign travel and all the other links which can bring together nation and nation, people and people, as human beings with a common nature and a common destiny. Is it not time that we began systematically to teach children international understanding far more than we do at the moment in our schools? Do we not also need to make a much more conscious approach in the schools to problems of the world and international affairs? Make no mistake about it— youth will respond to such an approach. There is a vivid realism about the young people of today upon which we can profitably build and extend as we work towards the ideal of world peace. I am convinced that it is only in such ways as I have outlined, and perhaps others besides, that we can evolve what I believe is the main aim and end of the educational process—balanced and hate-free personalities. Only in this way can we ultimately solve the problem of aggression and thus of war. And education occupies a key role in this. H. G. Wells once said that civilisation was a race between education and catastrophe. Even with all his prophetic powers he could never have foreseen how true his words could become in our present atomic age. Surely, it is the duty of all of us, for the sake of mankind, to see that education wins that race.

EDUCATION AND WAR

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The task of this paper is twofold :

1. To consider the nature of politicians with special reference to their educational background; and
2. To consider the results of an investigation into the development of attitudes towards war amongst children.

Politicians must not be excluded from any discussion of war simply because it is they who are concerned with international decision-making. A start may be made with the British member of Parliament, a man who does at least approach the foothills international summits. We may contemplate him as he makes his way along his chosen political path, questioning his origins, characteristics and aspirations.

Parliamentary candidates are initially self-selected. The self-chosen, some 20,000 strong, are scanned by local interviewing committees whose laudable intention it is to pick the best and finest candidate, and in this task they are occasionally prodded by the party central office. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing whether the committees act as sieves or filters for they merely ensure that someone to their taste is allowed to proceed as a candidate. Some 2,000 survive to undergo the martyrdom of elections where they can parade their virtues before the electorate.

When the 2,000 are considered closely most indications of their individuality have been subsumed by their party affiliation. As a whole they tend to subscribe to the familiar distinction between Conservative and Labour; this applies not only to their policies and addresses, but also, as we shall see, to their background. It is no doubt important to add that in their election brochures, "Labour candidates had a greater propensity to be photographed with a pipe, whereas Conservatives preferred to be portrayed in the company of dogs varying in their degree of shagginess."

In 1959, as soon as the results of the last general election were announced Prof. Cohen and I, at Manchester, undertook a study of the members of the newly-elected House. Members were invited to complete a biographical questionnaire, which included details of their educational background. It does, therefore, become possible to follow the educational routes which members followed in their more tender years. The figures quoted relate to the information gathered for nearly 100 per cent. of the members of Parliament.

The members of its two major parties run true to form by falling naturally into two species :

"Eton—Balliol" and "Elementary School—W.E.A." and their respective variants

In the case of the Conservatives, four out of every five attended a public school, of which Eton and Harrow account for a third. Sixty per cent. of all Conservatives then go into a university, of which Oxford claims half and Cambridge one-third.

Most Labour members, on the other hand, will have attended elementary, secondary, technical or grammar school, preference being given to elementary school. Forty per cent. of them enter universities, where Oxford and Cambridge still figure but only account for one-third of places the redbrick universities, and in particular London, provide the quadrangles for the future Labour men. Of the remainder, a further 40 per cent. happily find founts of wisdom outside the universities, at training colleges, for example, and in particular at Adult Education classes.

On entering their universities, Conservative members are notable for their interest in Arts and Law, whereas Labour members surpass their colleagues in their acquaintance with Social Studies. All but six of the total 33 scientists occupy Conservative benches, but the dozen medical men are nearly equally divided.

Whatever their formal education had been, members were engaged in occupations roughly in accord with this training. It seems otherwise, that Conservative members are more experienced in the armed services than Labour members ; 4 out of every 5 Conservative members having been so experienced, compared to 2 out of every 5 Labour members.

These patterns of party differences have been maintained for several decades, and show little sign of change. Variations do occur as each party waxes and wanes. So that when the Conservatives have the upper hand they admit into their ranks those of less pure breeding. Thus, the Eton-Harrow element in the party has declined to a mere 25 per cent. as their majority has increased ; in spite of this setback, public school representation as a whole remains stable at 80 per cent. The reverse tendency, i.e., regression to the hard core, is observable in the Parliamentary Labour Party, where the non-public school element presently stands at 80 per cent. These effects of relaxation and regression of membership seem characteristic of most democratic systems. One may wish to draw an analogy between this regression effect, and that observable amongst individuals when under stress. We are, therefore, in a position to predict the educational backgrounds of members in the forthcoming Houses by adding

or subtracting a few grains of democratic salt according to which party has the favour of the electorate. To this explanation must be added the possibility that the Central Party Offices are purposively seeking to extend their ranks. If so, then this is more noticeable in the case of the Parliamentary Conservatives who can now boast of trade union representation however, even with a majority of more than 100, this claim refers only to a single member.

The composition of the *Government* also follows our relaxation and regression effects. As you may now have predicted the proportion of public school men in the present Government has dwindled since 1951, from 90 per cent. to a mere 80 per cent., but the resonant voice of Eton-Harrow remains unhushed, and more audible than among the Government supporters. In 1950, when a Labour government was in power, three old Etonians were concentrated in the Labour cabinet. Indeed, Mr. Macmillan was aware of this fact, for he was heard to remark: " There were three Old Etonians in Mr. Attlee's Cabinet, I have six. Things have been twice as good under the Conservatives."

The *fathers* of members of the Government must have had considerable effect on their sons, for as many as 10 per cent. of them have had fathers engaged in politics usually but not invariably of the same colour. The political paternity rate is higher amongst Conservatives as a party, than amongst Labour members. If we were to add to this avuncular politicians, siblings, and others, the effects of kinship would be even greater as would the party difference. Great insight can be obtained into the informal aspects of political life by reflecting upon the extent of blood relationships, quite apart from the social relationships which members enjoy in their London clubs. These relationships seem to be more characteristic of Conservatives than Labour members; the latter emerges as a man devoted to solitary contemplation as his chosen hobbies of gardening and walking suggest.

These are some of the facts about M.P.s. How do they bear upon their attitudes towards war? All M.P.s would surely retort that war is a bad thing. The question which we really are faced with is, are these men sufficiently equipped to deal with a dangerous situation?

We have as yet no grounds for believing that a sojourn at Balliol is any more likely to lead to a bellicose member than sessions at the feet of a W.E.A. tutor. In any case, would Tories be socialists, and socialists Tories, if they had attended one another's schools? This is an experiment which even the most ardent Minister of Education would be reluctant to conduct. Even without its results, we may say that it is unlikely that attendance at a particular school *in itself* will influence political

values, if other contributing influences of social background and experience are allowed to go unchecked.

Our problem therefore becomes not so much one of attaching importance to the hypothetical effects of differences in educational background, but rather a matter of querying 'whether the background of members is such as to lead them to make errors in policy, action and debate.

There are a number of obvious criticisms which can be levelled at politicians in terms of their educational experience, their extensive business or T.U. interests, and their social unity. For example, an immediately striking aspect is the homogeneity of M.P.s. A higher degree of diversification may be desirable because homogeneous groups become absorbed in microscopic examination of minutiae to which they attach a disproportionate significance. They are apt to become involved in bitter disputes especially when they enlist in contests of hair-splitting, and the resulting tension spreads to larger issues. By contrast, a heterogeneous group is less given to pedantry and better able to take a wider view. Hence, disputes between parties seem less acrimonious than disputes within each Party.

On the other hand, we may ask whether there is any alternative to the interviewing committees for candidates. Monsieur Hippolyte Martel proposed that leaders of all political parties should be examined by an expert body of psychiatrists, who would be empowered to give them if they deserved it, a "certificate of aptitude for leading the country." These certificates, declared M. Martel, "would be for the politician what the driving licence is for the motorist." As a safeguard, he suggested that the psychiatrists themselves, before taking up their duties, should be examined by a panel of citizens "in possession of their full mental powers." He failed, however, to ensure that the citizens themselves should be "in possession of their full mental powers." Perhaps the solution lies in limiting candidates to those with suitable training, preferably in science. The value of a scientific education for the future British politician has been advocated on two grounds: first, that he would more readily apprehend the impact of technological change on an industrial society ; and second, he could bring into the political arena that flair for dispassionate assessment of a situation which a scientific training is supposed to cultivate. Assuming that a scientific education did produce such qualities, no one would dispute their value provided other virtues were not thereby displaced. All the same, it must be stressed that *evidence* of the value of a scientific education for all Parliamentary candidates can hardly be said to exist, and the same applies to any particular form of professional, industrial or other education.

It is probable that our interest must turn to the politician's

apparent inability to understand himself or opposing sides. That there may be some justification in this charge and scope for training in these respects is brought home to us if we reflect upon the extraordinary bizarre spectacle of two rival political blocs cherishing with equal passion the most divergent beliefs based on one and the same basis of fact. How is it possible for one politician to hold that the possession of nuclear weapons is a deterrent to war, while another can hold with equal conviction that they are likely to provoke war? Such an impasse might be explicable in terms of the very nature of the political mentality. Possibly candidates would not present themselves for election in the first instance if they were sublimely insensible to the possibility that they could ever be mistaken.

Furthermore, the ease with which a member embraces his party view can scarcely give us confidence that he fully understands it. The "nourishment" which the member receives "has not only been chewed, but digested, before it enters *his* mouth." So wrote Jonathan Swift. He attributed this to the influence of *one* upon many, and reminds his readers of the ancient Sybbarite statute, whereby those men who seek to control *others*, to gratify their pride, malice and ambition, must step out and make their propositions with a *rope* around their neck; if the matter proposed is generally approved then it should pass into Law; if it goes in the negative, the proposer to be immediately hanged. Like the threat of the expert body of psychiatrists, we would not hope that this system be introduced into England except as a last resort.

We do know that a member of Parliament is expected to be perfectly familiar with his party's policy. Once a member has begun to make a speech, we can often guess what he is going to say and could sometimes complete his speech for him. *What we do not know is how far he has grasped the policy he is subscribing to, and how far he understands his opponent's policy.* In those situations likely to lead to war, what could be more important than an understanding of US and an understanding of THEM?

Considerations such as these are pessimistic ones, for it becomes hard otherwise to escape the conclusion that Parliamentary debate and discussion are largely a waste of time. Nevertheless, remedies are not hard to find, although practical measures are few. We might, for instance, attack the loyalties of the party system—but not without fear that worse terrors would be in store. It seems that we must devise methods which will give the politician time, and a method for reflecting upon his own and the other side.

This state of affairs may be improved if no one were allowed to vote until he had satisfied both his own side and that of

his opponents that he grasped each point of view. The individual needs to *inspect* his own role, and that of other people's ; role inspection (or role-reflection) is added to role-reversal, since neither by themselves can be adequate. It may be objected that techniques such as these are forlorn and impractical, but if so it becomes even harder to avoid the conclusion that our Parliamentary debates are a waste of time. We are urging that the very act of engaging in this mental gymnastic might lead the participants to question their own assumptions and perhaps perceive some point in their opponents' point of view. Such a procedure may thus have the salutary effect of impelling members to make a genuine effort to appreciate what they are doing; the very struggle to understand may be the beginning of reconciliation.

Such methods may be useful in resolving conflicts due to misunderstandings and for enabling those subscribing to differences to understand what they are doing. We cannot hope that they would be effective in eliminating diverse interests when there is no misunderstanding. At the same time as advocating a procedure which may reduce misunderstandings, I must add that it involves an assumption itself which you may not be pre-pared to make. That is, that understanding is directly related to, and a cause of, fellowship. One might add quite to the contrary, that nothing could be worse for us than to understand one another completely. It does not follow that without the present misunderstandings between East and West, and the consequent feeling that things may somehow change for the better, that the conflict would be any the less; indeed, we may claim that a third World War has not yet occurred because of this very fact. Misunderstanding may be providing a basis for co-habitation.

I draw attention to this matter, not because I wish to conclude in favour of misunderstandings, but because the aim and definition of *understanding* is far from clear. Certainly, the understanding-fellowship sequitur is so widespread as to merit a special title perhaps " Polonius syndrome " is appropriate.

A discussion of politicians leads us, therefore, to question their nature, their effectiveness, and their disposition to change. The crux of the matter seems to be that there are political ideas and practices which are so fixed as to resemble prejudices. And this being so, then an appreciation of the formation of these is of some significance. At present, even if some ironical god were to present us with those 630 babies who will grow into future M.P.s, we would scarcely know—or agree upon—what to do with them. I conclude that our attention must pass to the growth of political values, and in particular to the growth of attitudes towards war.

I would like to discuss now the results of an investigation into some of these very matters. It is prompted by the questions "Do children have ideas about war" "At what age do they first form opinions about the subject? " " How do these opinions grow and mature? " " What is the" scope of these opinions? "

The results presented here are based upon an analysis of a study which I have recently conducted. Approximately 250 children were used as subjects, the children being selected from a number of state schools in England. Various methods were used to obtain information, viz., questionnaires, individual and group interviews. The children were drawn from three age groups, 8 years and less, 10 to 12 years and 14 to 16 years. Both sexes were included. The results are based upon an analysis of each age group and the apparent development of ideas about war. In addition, certain sex differences are noted.

Coherent utterances on the subject first occur around the age of 6 years. By the time the child is 7 or 8, he and most of his friends will have fairly well-defined ideas about war. The child of this age is primarily concerned with the *objects* of war, e.g., guns, aeroplanes, ships. They are sources of fascination for him, things which he spends many day-dreams musing about; his scrap books are filled with these objects, and his playtime devoted to them. To the 7 - 8 year-old war is, in essence, a *big fight*, it is something which he personally, at will, can engage in. What is more, war at this age is very *realistic*, it is not something which he is separated from by thousands of miles, decades or centuries, for the child has no difficulty in participating in wars, whether they are the fights regulated by the rules of gang warfare, historical battles or genuine quarrels. It is not surprising, therefore, that war begins its development in the human mind as something not entirely devoid of attractions, where glory, heroism, medals and duty have a place. Indeed, their development is such that to be doubtful whether to go to war or not calls for the comment, " Don't be a sissy," " Think of all the countries you can win," " You can shoot Germans," or as one seven-year-old boy put it: " O, come on lazy bones, it's only a fight, not the end of the world " . . .

By the time a child is about to take his 11-plus some significant changes have occurred from this foundation to his thinking. . He passes on to a stage of rejecting his childhood fancies, and begins to " think." The effect of this is to make his ideas about war less realistic in the sense that he has less contact isn't it. He still plays at wars and battles but he knows that isn't a real war. Real wars are something which involve people, actions, and consequences, items which figure in history and geography lessons, in the reminiscences of a grown-up, or antics on T.V.

Wars are beginning to become remote from him, because he is able to dissociate causes and effect, the imaginary from the real world. However, just as war becomes more remote, so it becomes more contemporary; at this age begins the glimmering of an idea of what a hydrogen bomb is, what a nuclear war is. The older he becomes so the more recent his reference point. This does not really make war any less attractive, the earlier claims are supported by a new-found reasoning, whereby Queen and country, family and protection, are forcibly used as arguments for war the 11-year-old is not unfamiliar with the argument, " Your country needs *you*."

At 15 years, the remoteness of war is nearly complete, and at the same time it has become a matter of , H-bombs. It would be unwise, therefore, to describe this attitude as realistic "simply because his knowledge of nuclear war is good ; what he lacks, and what his development seem to predetermine is the ability to think of the causes, actions, and consequences of war as anything really to do with himself.

Does the child think that war is a good or bad thing? Again the 15-year-old view is very different from that of the youngster. As a child grows up so he begins to see other sides of the question ; the starting point, i.e., at 7 years, is one where war has its attractions, but on the whole is a bad thing. Many children may be echoing their parents' and teachers' condemnation of fighting, but even when this factor is taken into account the personal consequences of war (fighting) are too unpleasant to make it desirable. They find it difficult to justify war, except under physical provocation. By 15, however, the very act of maturing which enables the child to divorce himself from a single perspective also prompts a *more favourable* attitude towards war. His new-found reciprocity of thought which ideally enables him to gain sympathy with other people, to appreciate *their* motives and not only his own, does not extend to include countries, and when it does his increased understanding of the psychology of others leads him to be more suspicious of them. Nevertheless, the affection for the human race and the respect for human liberties and rights are available at this age for the educationalist; the mental ability for this feeling exists, but their expression is confined to individual people and scarcely to countries. It seems that a further stage of reciprocity, i.e., between groups of which the individual is a member, must be achieved before these noble sentiments become universal. This state of affairs is not unaffected by the fact that, whereas the idea of war occurs early on in the development of the child, the meaning of nuclear war only comes later, so that " mature " thinking has its basis in something out-of-date.

We are referring here to the " provokability " of children, and

an indication of what circumstances they think would justify war. It is interesting that it is not the quality of the justification that changes as the child grows older, but its quantity; the older child appears *more* provokable.

At all ages, *defence* is the predominant theme, and it is surprising how the pronouncements of the old are to be found in only slightly different garb amongst the young. Thus, a seven year-old Defence Minister describes war as "to do with goodies 'and baddies,' and it's all right to make war provided you don't start it first." A goodie is someone who doesn't start a war, he just joins in—if he didn't he would be nothing. And naturally the speaker by definition, is a "goodie." This type of thinking provides a basis for more mature thoughts. The difference is that an older person perceives the danger to be greater and more widespread. Children may be asked to compare a number of different circumstances for going to war, viz., when the country itself is in danger, when the person's family is in danger, and when an ally (U.S.A.) is in danger. At the older ages danger to the safety of family and country stimulate almost unanimous support; amongst the young the defence of allies stands out as being the worst provocation, and this is in accord with the valuation which the young place upon friendship and duty. By the time that a child is 15, however, the U.S.A. is considered by many to be inadequate reason for going to war. Utmost concern, however, is given to the country England, and the corresponding attribute *patriotism* cannot be emphasised enough as contributing to bellicose response. Patriotism provides the principal cause for going to war as the person matures. it also provides the basis for judgements of what has happened in the past. Taking the Second World War as an example, 15-year-olds have no hesitation in acclaiming England to be right in going to war, whereas Japan is increasingly accused of being wrong as the child grows older.

The older a child gets so his subjective patriotism expands. At young ages we find that Manchester is home and London alien, later Scotland may become part of the patriotic feeling but his ultimate development is such that it is limited at least to the shores of the British Isles. Whilst the source of patriotism grows, so the recognition of foreign places increases and, with it, alienation.

Let me now try to summarise what I have said. Ideas about war can be seen to have their origins in very young childhood. There is a sequence of stages through which the child goes, and each stage is noted by a characteristic type of thinking which is based upon what has happened in earlier years. We can distinguish two major trends, thus:

7-8 years

The child understands war in terms of his own experience, War is a realistic experience corresponding to a *big fight*, and he thinks according to a conventional war, not a nuclear war. The attractions of war are personal glory and acclaim, but the detractions of war outweigh these, since the detractions involve personal hurts and ignominies and the admonishments of parents. As a contributing factor to war, *patriotism* has little place, partly because the youngster's thinking has not differentiated countries sufficiently. Patriotism is surpassed by duty to parents and allies.

Senior

The 15-year-old appreciates war in its many aspects. He has a concept of war involving objects, actions, people, countries and consequences. He is informed about nuclear war, and expresses human sentiments of respect for liberty and life. His contact with war is more remote, however, than the youngster. What is more, the very intellectual development which gives him his intellectual superiority enables him to see war from various perspectives, with the result that war is more justifiable and plausible than in the one-sided view of the youngster. The primary justifications are family and patriotism ; and he often argues in a way appropriate to conventional war.

These are the two notable stages, between them coming other stages of partial development. Whilst the specific matters involved may be open to question and confirmation from further research, it seems that these conclusions are not inconsistent with the results of studies of child development in other spheres, notably those of Piaget on the development of moral values in the child.

As they stand, our conclusions apply primarily to boys. The ladies present may well have been muttering disapprovals at some of my conclusions. They are indeed justified since girl pupils do differ from their boy neighbours, and in ways which are perhaps in accord with the general ' image ' of the female sex. The prime difference lies amongst the older subjects, where the girls are more aware of the implications which war has for personal liberties and rights, that is, the disintegrating effect wherein war has on personal relationships, and in particular, the family. On the other hand, or perhaps following from this, girls appear to be more provokable than boys particularly where defence of the home and country are concerned. In other words, the female has that quality of denying war when it is remote, but is the first to respond when those things she loves are imperilled.

What implications do these investigations carry? It seems likely that adult views may be described according to whether

they are at one or other of these stages. it is not hard to think of people and views expressed which might otherwise be put into our developmental categories, a point which suggests people get 'stuck' at a particular stage and 'progress' no more ; or even 'regress' to earlier stages' when faced with a provocative situation.

The words 'progress' and 'regress' are not the right ones to use. Of this there can be no doubt, if we are to be concerned with the prevention of war. Can we say that the older pupils are in a more advanced stage of development relative to the survival of the human race? Certainly not, for there are grounds for believing that the youngsters are at a 'safer' stage.

If changes are introduced in the early years then it is likely that their effects will be noticeable in more adult development. The changes which are desirable for the later years are: an integration of their human feelings about conventional war with the facts of nuclear war—the moral valuation and often approval of conventional war needs to catch up with nuclear war; secondly, that in their appreciation of many sides of war, they are able to agree with this Association on the prevention of war; thirdly, that their appreciation of the dangers of war is not limited by their needs to belong—by their patriotism.

Thus, we might tentatively conclude that very definite educational measures may be taken to achieve these objects.

1. It is immediately obvious from the material which I have collected, that the teaching of history and geography influences the results obtained. In so far that in the primary school children savour something of the delights of war, and that these are items which the child remembers, then this teaching becomes suspect. The classic teaching of history appears to stimulate ideas of war that are inconsistent with nuclear war and particularly to reinforce patriotism. Whether the teacher likes it or not, his pupil will use the historical data to found ideas which will formulate his later ideas about war. What is more, there is some evidence that the production and ability of the child is often stimulated in art and composition classes by making use of his so-called "native" aggression. The parents and T.V. must not be excluded from this analysis, but now it is at least possible to see their value, as well as their faults.
2. To be more specific, the youngsters' realistic views about war clearly need to include an awareness of what nuclear war means. One way of doing this is to integrate nuclear war into those activities which seem to control their type of thinking, i.e., their games. I have in mind here a "nuclear game," one in which the strategies and consequences of nuclear warfare can be sampled by the child. For example, a device marketed

which could be thrown and emit a harmless dust but which could change the colour of a large disc which the participants wear, would simulate the H-Bomb and radiation ; rules of play which involved the conventional winner being the loser, which reversed the conventional morality – like playing Bridge to lose, a game called Tunnel—would supply the realism of the nuclear war.

Something of this nature is necessary since we can predict that whatever our hopes, children will fight amongst themselves; it is a matter of supplying them with ideas and materials which will affect their subsequent development, and not destroy those very qualities which make them children. In any case, such practical proposals are verifiable

3. Whilst we cannot expect that the naïve morality which might reject war can be carried through to adulthood, we can predict that the early acquisition of knowledge about the nuclear situation will affect later thinking. As far as the moral attitude towards war is concerned, it is a striking fact that the evolution of the highly-praised reciprocity of thought as it presently occurs tends to provoke patriotism and militate against peace.

Intellectual development outruns emotional development in the child, in a way that seems analogous to present technical progress outrunning our ability to deal with human problems. What we might demand is that the whole trend of educational development should be reversed, and that it is in fact unwise to see war from more than one point of view. It would, of course, be both intolerable and impracticable to save the child from influences which are bound to impinge. The solution to this apparent paradox is certainly an educational challenge—but not one which must be insoluble. The need is clearly for a reciprocity of thought and feeling less confined to the country of origin, and for an imagination which can take in history and cope with events which are occurring thousands of miles away. The preparedness of the 15-year-old for the meaning of human rights and liberties and for the respect to life, are clearly there, but the matter of nuclear war does not seem to attract the teacher. And yet at that age the flowering of the adult mind lies in his grasp.

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NON-VIOLENCE IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIME

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There is a natural concern in the community about crime, and particularly about violent crime, since murders, coshings and assaults make headlines. No useful purpose can be served by minimising the extent and effect of crime, but it is equally useless to exaggerate the situation and to allow alarm to be unjustifiably widespread. Murders, for instance, occur in England and Wales at the rate of about one every two-and-half days. The murders in a year total about the same as the road deaths in a week—but those who suggest that we are all in imminent danger of being murdered, cross the streets or ride about in motor-cars without realising that their chances of being killed thereby are fifty times greater than the chance of being murdered. The crimes of violence as a whole represent about 2 per cent. of the indictable crimes known in this country, but they receive considerably more than two per cent. of the publicity accorded to crime. Fear of violence is thus enhanced, though understanding would be much more valuable.

Some violent crimes, such as wage-snatches and hold-ups, are, of course, deliberately planned by those who simply mean to live on the proceeds, but these offenders form a very small proportion of the whole. They are a particular problem in an acquisitive society which is concerned more about the method than the fact of acquisition. For the great majority of crimes it is necessary to seek basic causes and, where crimes of violence are concerned, this is particularly so. Many assaults and offences of violence arise from family or neighbourly quarrels and are the end result of tensions arising from unsolved problems of relationships, many of which are at least temporarily resolved by the resort to violence. But this is not an ideal method and it has no permanence. The problems involved are social, often arising from conditions for which society has a grave responsibility; nevertheless they can, in many cases, be eased or solved if known about in time for some agency or social worker to help the parties to understand themselves and therefore to understand each other. Many a complaining wife, husband or neighbour has been helped in this way by a marriage guidance counsellor, a probation officer, a minister or a good friend, but too many lack either the opportunity or the ability to use such help, and it cannot be forced upon them. Their ultimate violence, in the absence of such help, is usually limited and local, but it goes to swell the criminal statistics.

A considerable amount of more publicly directed violence (often indiscriminately directed) is committed by individuals far removed from the popular conception of the desperate criminal. Violence is often the reaction, against frustration, disappointment or defeat, of the weakling or the inadequate, or the subnormal individual; the heavy-jowled bruiser-type image is a rarity where crimes of violence are concerned.

While others get through their examinations, get and keep their jobs, find their girl friends and are popular in the dance halls or on their motor-cycles, the inadequates fail at each point, and each failure makes the next one more likely . . . and so they end up in the bottom stream, holding the odd jobs, lacking glamorous friends or the means to possess a motor-cycle . . . and they feel very inferior in comparison with their apparently more successful friends. Their blind rebellion against a situation they do not understand may often produce a sudden act of violence against people or property. If they fall in with a gang of equally inadequate friends, the accumulated strength of the gang gives each of them personal strength and inhibits fear. A cosh or a bicycle chain similarly gives strength to the weak and minimises the fear of retaliation which would be involved in hand to hand combat. It is not that the thugs are cowards, as the popular conception has it, but rather that the craven and cowardly take to violence as they know no other way. There is a satisfying sense of power in a gang or with a weapon which can counterbalance the sense of failure and powerlessness.

The answer to such violence is not to be found in counter- violence or in repressive treatments, but in an effort to understand the offenders and to try to meet their inadequacies. Dramatic and violent punishments may do more harm than good, by making the offenders feel that they really were " big-shots after all, against whom society must employ its heaviest weapons.

Non-repressive treatment is more likely to help them to find their way to a normal place in society. Society readily accepts the need to bring life as near to the normal as possible for the blind, the disabled, the mentally ill; allowances are made for deficiencies, support and training are provided for the disabled— to reduce the economic effects of their disabilities. For the socially inadequate the same needs must be met. If they cannot cope with the highly competitive life of their day, they can be taught to accept their position, they can be encouraged to use such abilities as they possess and so to develop their own sense of satisfaction. Thus their lives can be made more nearly normal and their sense of loss or failure countered. This is a long and careful process, needing the help of skilled workers, but society provides these through such services as those of child care and probation. These services, in fact, if not in theory, are offering

non-retaliatory treatment to those who are a nuisance or a liability to society, and their efforts are directed to limiting such liabilities or, in many cases, turning them into assets. This can be done only on a personal basis, by the establishment of a non- condemning relationship; it does not mean that offences are condoned, but it may mean that their real significance is explained and understood by the offender himself.

Repressive and penal methods involving the removal of the offender from home to some institution emphasises the difference between the offender and the rest of society, whereas his real need is to have this difference minimised and efforts should be directed towards developing his ability to fit into society. Even the best institution has difficulty in doing this. Nevertheless, many constructive efforts have been and are being made to use institutional life to the best advantage through the establishment of open training institutions, camps, the use of prisoners for work in the local community and the development of similar experiments which help to dissolve the barrier between the offender and the community. Much has also been done by prison visitors, teachers, welfare officers and others who are able to go into institutions while remaining part of the outside world. But even the most open institution provides an abnormal environment within which is safety and security from many problems to be faced in normal life. The tendency must be towards the treatment of an increasingly high proportion of offenders outside institutions so that their lives may be as little disrupted as possible and they may continue to live—or learn to live—as normal members of the community.

The probation system provides the major method of treatment on this basis—it enables the offender in most cases to re- main at home, to maintain his education, or his work if he has any, or to continue to provide for his dependants, but at the same time provides an opportunity for him to receive guidance and, if necessary, control in redirecting his life, in understanding him- self and his problems. At the same time attention can be given through appropriate social agencies to any material or environmental factors which may have contributed to the breakdown in his conduct. This applies whether the offence was one of violence or not, but in the case of violent offenders it is particularly important for the tensions to be reduced and some calm support to be available. Probation is essentially non-violent in its approach, for any counter-aggression to the aggression with which the offender may begin his relationship will be disastrous; the probation officer and other social workers who may be involved will probably have to absorb a great deal of aggression from the offender before any positive relationship can develop. When confidence has been established, however, much can be

done in friendship and tolerance. The state does not set its probation service out of any belief in non-violence, but this and other services demonstrate how much can be done by offering assistance rather than retaliation to those who have offended other ways made themselves a burden to society.

It is unfortunate that so often anti-social conduct has to be suffered before society realises that a problem exists, but hopeful preventive experiments have shown that this need not be so. Great teachers like Lyward, David Wills and Howard Jones have demonstrated the value of treating disturbed, unhappy and potentially aggressive children and young people by steady tolerance and consistent acceptance of their many moods and changes of conduct. "Be vulnerable," says Lyward, which is the same thing as being unarmed to meet aggression. Only so does the aggressor come to know that he has nothing to fear and so nothing to be angry about. Lyward forced nothing, compelled no lessons, but was content to wait and to take opportunities when they came, to tell a story, develop a lesson, discuss a problem. This is the true non-violence—a perpetual readiness to meet the difficult, the aggressive and the fearful (often the same thing) and it is the only entirely non-harmful way.

To diminish antagonism and dissolve anti-social feelings by offering understanding and constructive alternatives which will develop potentialities probably unknown to the offender, is to apply the method of non-violence in individual cases. There seems to be no reason why the same method could not apply in meeting larger problems. Any reduction in aggression is a step towards peace.

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PSYCHOSIS, DELINQUENCY AND WAR

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I should like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to speak to this conference. Psychiatrists are asked to speak about many things, and I think it important that we should limit ourselves to matters about which we may have a valuable, if limited contribution to make. On the subject of this Conference I think that we can say something, for as Jung has said : " In the last resort the soul is the place of origin of all action, and therefore of everything which happens by the will of man."

Part of our work is based on observation. That is observing the actions of people, in particular times, places and circumstances. The other part of our work is sharing in the struggles of our patients and exploring with them the inner world of thought, feeling, image and fantasy. To do this we need to respect the other human being and to work with sympathy and compassion. Later we have to try to relate these inner and outer aspects into a more coherent whole. It is in some ways a strange work, and it should cause no particular surprise if the psychiatrist is sometimes considered strange or odd. I am reminded in this connection of some lines by T. S. Eliot :

" The wounded surgeon plies the steel
That questions the distempered part;
Beneath the bleeding hands we feel
The sharp compassion of the healer's art . . ."

Researches in the psychiatric field have disclosed something of the nature of the psychotic process and its characteristics. There is the withdrawal or loss of contact with the shared reality. There is the regression, or return to more primitive modes of thought and feeling, having much in common with the world of dreams. It is a world of magic and symbol. There are high levels of anxiety and this too may be of a primitive kind, linked with paranoid, splitting mechanisms. Destructive fantasies are common. The language of the cold war seems to tap this level of function and the writings of the nuclear strategists abound with neologisms and a peculiar absence of affect.

Patients suffering with a schizophrenic illness usually become isolated socially, and ineffective and disjointed in their actions. However, it is possible to understand and make contact with them, and successful treatment by psychotherapeutic means has been demonstrated in the work of Jung, Rosen, Sechahaye, Searles and others.

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A SUBSTITUTE FOR PATRIOTISM

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The concept of patriotism has considerable a reality behind it still. There was a time when it had an unchallenged positive connotation (*dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*). But this has passed and the idea of patriotism now evokes an ambivalent response.

Freud considered that the price of progress in civilization is paid by forfeiting happiness through heightening the sense of guilt. We are technologically but not emotionally ready for a world community. In progressing from smaller to larger groups we gain law, efficiency and wider fellow-feeling but we surrender individual freedom.

Patriotism and loyalty are means of partially subjugating personal self-interest and aggression, but they sanction aggression to out-groups and allow a regressive childishness of thought. The burden of rationality is lighter if widely shared, thus patriotism can combine positive feeling for the in-group with an almost paranoid negative feeling for the enemy. So that while it elicits disinterested, self-sacrificing and laudable behaviour, it does so by a process of identification of the individual with his national community, in the interests of which he is allowed to act selfishly and indulge in violently aggressive feelings towards other national groups. Although patriotic feeling is an outlet for anger, it is also an outlet for love. Yet it may be necessary to have an enemy to hate before we can begin to love our neighbours.

Aggression can be viewed as a basic drive, or as due to the frustration of the pleasure-principle. These unconscious elements have to be canalized to be socially acceptable, but the renunciation of selfish satisfaction is never final and remains an active effortful process. Aggression is dealt with by internalizing it to form a part of the superego, which is harsh and oppressive in dealing with the ego. Sense of guilt is, Freud thought, specially due to repressed aggressiveness. There are "guilt cultures" relying on superego condemnation and "shame cultures" which rely on social condemnation. People brought up in guilt cultures feel morally superior to those brought up in shame cultures because the latter are uncomfortable only when found out, while the former feel guilty all the time.

Human history has shown the extension of in-group identification from village, lineage group, and tribe, to successively wider social groups. The limit of this process was nationalism, but in the new era of weapons of mass destruction, the continuance of full national sovereignty represents a grave threat to the sur-

vival of mankind. Riesman contrasts the traditional " inner directed " with " outer-directed " cultures. We assume that inner-direction is best, but it is not as easily shared between peoples agreed rules. For example, in the current test ban talks, each as is a certain amount of outer-direction such as submission to of inner-direction, so an elaborate system of inspection is contrived to ensure the mutual side distrusts the other's in observance of outer-direction.

The existence of a supranational authority has long been advanced and is now becoming an urgent necessity. Could people yet succeed in identifying their personal needs with those of the whole of mankind? Freud believed that the social superego " sets itself an impossible goal with the command: " love thy neighbour as thyself " — impossible because it can never be reinforced with reward. Religion has traditionally persuaded people that their reward will be in heaven, but Freud's view was that as long as virtue is not rewarded in this life, ethics will preach in vain. Perhaps emphasis will have to be placed on the realistic threat and the acceptance of outer-direction on an international scale, at least for the first few generations of the nuclear era. Freud believed that the best hope for peace was an aesthetic revulsion against war, combined with a realistic appraisal of its consequences. Perhaps we can now invoke the gratification of the ego which comes from working in harmony with a rational understanding of reality? We seem at last to be able to cultivate the more immediate, tangible rewards by participating in great international undertakings of which W.H.O., F.A.O., Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Voluntary Service Overseas, and the Peace Corps are the first manifestations. There is a widening of fellow-feeling and a greater sense of compassion in the air. We tend now to give more help to the physically, mentally or criminally handicapped. Is it unrealistic to believe that one _day, men and women of all nations may be able to say with John Donne: " For I am involved in mankind " ?*

* This is a summarised report of the original address compiled by the Editor from Prof. Carstairs' notes.

INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS KENNETH

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I suppose strikes are like wars in that. they are an ultimate sanction, a last resort ; but they are unlike them in that the " ultimate " very rarely involves physical violence, and even then incidentally — not to say accidentally . in this country, what little violence has accompanied strikes seems mostly been committed by non-strikers taking advantage of an unsettled situation. Strikes are by now a relatively domesticated and therefore relatively " civilised " form of conflict: today, most of them are short demonstrations. They may be regrettable, they may be magnificent (it depends which way you think) ; but they are certainly not war.

Like all forms of conflict, they indicate discontent, and are by no means its only form of expression among turnover, workers. Other possible signs are a high rate of labour turnover, absenteeism, sickness and accidents, sabotage and restrictive practices, addiction to drink or the pools (or to any other escapist routine), or intensive political activity. So is habitual pilfering, which may be due not so much to economic need as to social resentment. Not all these are equally acceptable.

Unrest finds expression in strikes only if workers have some social cohesion and tradition of common action. Coal miners may strike where young unorganised women in the clothing industry, say, may go sick or leave their jobs. Moreover, the same people react differently if their circumstances change; so that a decline in the number or severity of strikes does not necessarily mean that unrest is less: it may merely mean that it is finding expression in other ways or not openly at all. The symptoms of industrial unrest can range, then, from the vaguest indications at one end of the scale to organised go-slow, strikes and political activity at the other—the form of expression being determined by a complex mechanism of economic, political, technological and psychological factors.

All this doesn't help much; but if there is any truth in it one might expect to find some connection between these different manifestations. People have, in fact, found traces of an alternation " between strikes and absenteeism, and even between strikes and political activity; but hard facts and figures in many of these fields are difficult to come by, while strikes are the most obvious and dramatic of the symptoms, and provide the simplest heads under which to collect information. Partly for this reason (but partly also because strikes have, historically, been considered a form of crime) strike statistics exist, in most

countries, in considerable detail and covering a long period. And while data on the more devious manifestations of unrest are at best limited or sample data, strike statistics are not samples but more or less inclusive compilations, and are thus the best quantitative evidence there is.

I will not bore you with a list of the peculiar difficulties of using strike statistics. Strikes are, for instance, classified according to their " main cause or object "; but not only do most strikes —like other human actions—break out on a multiplicity of issues, the relative importance of which may change as the strike goes on, but the main issue on which the strike appears to be fought may turn out to be more or less irrelevant to the real cause of discontent: " no impartial student of strikes," wrote a researcher in this field some years ago, " can fail to be impressed by the lack of correlation between the precipitating cause of the strike and the amount of feeling necessary to lead to such drastic action . . . the choice of a bone of contention, whether in industrial life or in personal relations or anywhere else in society, may often be almost accidental."

Even the simplest strike figures are hard to interpret. What meaning is there in a change in the number of strikes when a one-day stoppage of 10 clothing workers, a 7-month strike of 1,000,000 coal miners and a 9-day general strike of workers in all the main industries of the country, each count as one strike? Again, a figure of 600 " working days lost " might refer to a strike of 600 men for one day, a strike of 100 men for six days, 6 one-day strikes of 100 men apiece, and so on. These are hardly the same kind of thing, even if they all happen in the same factory —still less if they happen in different factories, different industries and different times.

So our main source of evidence (apart from Press reports and a very few case histories) has very definite limitations. But one ought, from official statistics, to be able to say something about the " strike-proneness " of different groups of workers—at least to be able to say who strikes most. We cannot measure a far more interesting sort of " strike-proneness " — people's propensity to strike rather, say, than go absent or change their jobs. But we can compare their striking at one time with their own performance at other times, and we can measure it in relation to that of workers in other industries or districts (always allowing for the size of the industry or district in question). And when we have answered the question " who strikes most? " and go on to ask " why do the strike? " we can compare the various series of strike figures with cyclical fluctuations in employment, wages, prices and so on, as well as with other things —accident rates, indices of adverse social conditions perhaps., or even variations in the seasons or the weather. But all this is

only scratching the surface of the problem, for the determinants of strikes cover an almost unlimited field: " it would probably be no exaggeration to say, " wrote a New Zealand author some years ago, "that in the problem of industrial unrest are focussed nearly all the major problems of social organisations, in not only its economic aspects, but in its political structure, and also in our individual and social morality. "

Any table showing the relative propensity to strike of British predominance of strikes in coal mining: recently, miners have been responsible for half to three-quarters of all recorded strikes. This predominance is underlined by the fact that for a long time coal-mining was the only industry for which the Ministry of Labour regularly gave " net " as well as " gross " figures of strikers—although recently they have done it for dock workers and (more recently still) for motor-car workers.

A paper written by two American authorities in 1951 showed that it was not only in Britain that miners and dockers were the readiest to strike, and that there had been an appreciable similarity in the industrial strike-patterns of many countries. The explanations, they thought, were partly sociological and partly economic: the workers most prone to strike "live " in their own separate communities " ; they have " their own codes, myths, heroes and social standards " ; they are "a largely homogeneous, undifferentiated mass they all do about the same work and have about the same experiences " ., "all a people have grievances, but what is important is that the members of each of these groups have the same grievances—industrial hazards, or severe depression unemployment, or bad living conditions which seem additionally evil because they are supplied by the employer, or low wages, or intermittent work " ; there is not the " class stratification " that is found in building or metal trades, in catering, or in a government office ; the jobs are specialised and not of the pleasantest, and there is little mobility in and out of such industries. If it is objected that (in Britain) nationalisation has changed some of this but that the same workers still strike, we must assume that old habits die hard, or that new forms of economic organisation breed new frictions —or where public opinion IS tinged—as in Britain it has been said to be — with a low opinion of these workers' social status, this is likely to enhance their feeling of isolation and therefore of so darity at critical times.

The contrast emerging from this American study – between the strike-prone workers who live in " isolated masses" and the, relatively " peaceful " workers who live more as individuals

integrated into a complex society—was confirmed as a long-term phenomenon in Britain by an attempt of mine to measure "strike-proneness" in a crude way both for industries and regions between 1911 and 1945. Miners easily topped the list; in textiles it was the cotton operatives, in engineering and shipbuilding it was the shipbuilders, and in transport it was the railway-men in earlier years and the dockers and road transport workers in later years, that struck disproportionately to their numbers. As for the regions, South Wales headed the list, although the propensity of Welshmen to strike declined over time; Lancashire declined from the middle of the period, while Scotland and the West Riding tended to rise towards the end.

It is admittedly a bit academic to try to separate regional from industrial "strike-proneness," even though the underlying assumption (that the social environment of workers, outside industry, will affect their propensity to strike) seems plausible enough. But any measure of regional "strike-proneness" is bound to reflect, to a big extent, the regional concentration of industries; and when our figures had been standardised to allow for this, much of the difference in regional strike-proneness disappeared—but not that in industrial strike-proneness. In other words, as might be expected, it seemed to matter less where people lived than what they did for a living. If South Wales, Lancashire and so on appeared "strike-prone," then this was surely partly because their industrial structure was unbalanced in that certain industries had been highly concentrated there while other industries scarcely existed at all, and therefore the conditions of work and life had sometimes been savagely depressed; and also because in these regions people lived near their work in densely packed communities, and it was therefore easier for them to combine and for their attitudes to affect their fellows. Conversely, any policy (such as that of the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy) of diversifying the industrial structure of such regions, or of creating balanced townships where people live away from their work and further from their fellow-workers, ought to reduce a regional propensity to strike—quite apart from any effect it might have on the economic prosperity of the region. There has been some diversification achieved since 1939—most successfully perhaps, it is interesting to note, in Wales.

When I pass on to asking why, and under what conditions, people strike, I shall distinguish between three types of cause—immediate causes, conditioning causes and underlying causes—since any given strike will be coloured by all three.

The statistics of the immediate causes of strikes are, as I have said, dubious; but their general trend can be summarised by saying that, while wage questions (together with hours of

work) still appear to be the most important issue, their importance has been diminishing somewhat over the past half-century in favour of what may be called "frictional" issues, including what the Ministry of Labour used to call "working arrangements, rules and discipline." Strikes on what one may call "solidarity" issues (sympathetic strikes and strikes on what was called "trade union principle") have fluctuated fairly haphazardly; of these, strikes for the mere right to organise have presumably declined while those for the "closed shop" (in the sense of 100-per-cent. trade-union organisation) have lately increased. Any relative decline in the importance of wage strikes (and these still account for half to two-thirds of the total) might, from an armchair, be complacently explained away as due to the proliferation of wage-fixing machinery—the assumption being that wage disputes are increasingly often anticipated or settled by other means; the strikes on working arrangements and so on, despite their relative increase, ought, one might hope (since they appear to involve basic industrial questions less than strikes on wages and hours), to yield to better "human relations"—fuller joint consultation at lower levels, improved welfare, a more astute or enlightened industrial psychology, and so on. But the trouble is that the change, such as it is, is not necessarily what it seems, since the issues on which strikes break out are often largely symbolic. All one can say is that the statistics of the immediate causes of strikes, in so far as they tell us anything, do at least make some sense in the light of what we already know.

The conditioning causes of strikes include, first of all, the trade cycle—because the prospects of forcing concessions seem better, and the possible penalties of failure less, when profits and employment are rising. Many studies have shown that strike fluctuations (in particular, fluctuations in the number of strikes) do show some correspondence with cyclical economic fluctuations. This is true for Britain, Germany, Canada and some other countries, and there is in consequence some degree of international correspondence in short-run changes in the number of strikes. It is not surprising that the number of strikes (a figure which, despite the difficulties I mentioned earlier, does presumably give some idea of the number of separate friction-points in industry) should be the most sensitive of all strike series to economic events; other figures, such as the numbers of workers involved or of days "lost," or averages of the size or length of strikes, are likely to be more affected by non-economic influences such as the trend of union policy and the character of union leadership. There has, however, been some tendency for big strikes to break out during downswings, when the unions decided to resist money wage cuts until the deepening of the slump

inhibited further action by the threat of unemployment. But the limits of economic determinism in explaining strike move, pretty narrow in any case ; moreover, these movements are less spontaneous than they once were and have been increasingly subject to organisational checks and controls (war-time restrictions and other labour legislation, the development of negotiating and disputes machinery, and so on).

Other things, of course, have probably helped to " condition " the incidence of strikes : the seasonal working of certain industries, the fortunes of war, the timing of holidays, the extent of trade-union membership, and even the weather (but this last may be a disguised economic effect, as the weather has some influence on seasonal economic activity anyway). Moreover, strikes may possibly be " infectious " to some extent : in Britain there has been, over time, a strong correlation between strike movements in the different industries. But it is impossible to separate the effect of this apparent " infectiousness " from that of the trade cycle itself — to say how far the correspondence between, say, miners' and engineers' striking is due to " strike fever " and how far it is due to the fact that boom periods offer good opportunities to each set of workers independently. The same sort of thing applies to the connection of strikes with the extent of trade-union organisation, for union membership itself also fluctuates with the trade cycle. But, although there is evidence to show that even before the Second World War—and, indeed, very much earlier than that a large proportion of British strikes were unofficial (that is, unsupported by the trade- union leadership), the degree of union organisation probably has some effect on striking if only because the organised are better equipped to strike than the unorganised. The independent influence of political agitators on striking seems, on available evidence, to have been small in Britain at most times.

Many studies of industrial relations stress the importance of underlying causes, whose operation may never become explicit at all and which are therefore the student's despair. The decline of craftmanship and therefore of pride in work, the growing size and impersonality of firms and therefore the growing insignificance of the individual worker, bad social conditions, new forms of industrial fatigue due to the intensity and monotony of repetition work, the growing isolation of the trade-union rank-and-file from their specialised negotiating officials, the remoteness and delay of nation-wide bargaining—all these have been suggested as causes of unrest ; not to mention the fundamental conflict, sometimes thought to be unresolvable, of economic and social interest between employer and worker. All this underlines the worker's essential inferiority—his relative propertylessness, his lack of mobility, his ignorance of what his labour is really worth,

his insecurity, his lack of control over the stresses of his work— and, point out the industrial psychologists " inferiority compensation finds its outstanding expression in the strike." An important and related aspect of strikes is that they represent a complete break, a release from everyday compulsions. Thus it is not accidental that American strikers should have called themselves " vacationists ; that " playing " should have been a traditional British euphemism for striking ; that Belgian miners should have referred to their strikes as " pit holidays " ; and that the Spanish word for strike should also mean leisure, recreation and merrymaking. There are analogies in other languages.

Thus it is that when we consider the immediate causes of strikes we may be looking only at symbols. Wage strikes, for instance, still the commonest form of strikes the world over, rarely indicate poverty below subsistence level. It was pointed out long ago that low wages were an unimportant cause, that the worst paid workers had usually not the resources, nor the organisation, nor the energy for strikes, and that the main causes were " more fundamental, and may be only slightly affected by adjustments of wages." Strikes for wages proportionate to what the trade can bear," or to the wages of other workers, probably derive more from the worker's feeling of inferiority than from his poverty. This is borne out by the fact that, despite trade-union argumentation, considerations of real wages play little conscious part in strikes ; at any rate, money-wage cuts have been resisted more fiercely, even though real wages are rising, than money-wage increases have been demanded to keep pace with a fall in real wages.

Within the past half-century the nature of strikes in Britain has changed a good deal. Although at all times there are countless petty frictions that could lead to strikes, whether they do so or not depends partly on the presence or absence of deeper grievances. This is particularly true of major strike-waves such as those immediately before and after the First World War, when Edwardian luxury and class-ostentation, contrasted with a long-term fall in real wages and followed by war profiteering, produced an exasperation which found its outlet in strikes led by men who advocated " workers' control " as the only means of raising the worker's status. H. G. Wells was writing in 1912: " the supply of good-tempered, cheap labour—upon which the fabric of our contemporary ease and comfort is erected—is giving out. The worker is beginning now to strike for unprecedented ends— against the system, against the fundamental conditions of labour, to strike for no defined ends at all, perplexingly and disconcertingly. The old-fashioned strike was a method of bargaining, clumsy and violent perhaps, but bargaining still ; the new-fashioned strike is far less of a haggle, far more of a display of temper."

But after the war, the bitter experience of the General Strike and the chronic depression turned the Labour movement from industrial to political action. Moreover, real wages rose for those in work, and the "good old days " never returned for the upper classes. The strike wave subsided; " workers control " in the Syndicalist sense was gradually forgotten. The worker's status was to be raised by a Labour. Government which would guarantee full employment and massive social services: Keynes, and later Beveridge, showed that this was possible without making a clean sweep of capitalism. During the Second World War there was little ideological opposition from the extreme Left (at any rate after 1941), a greater Labour participation in government, a more genuine community of danger, and more equitable rationing and price control—all of which must have helped to prevent serious strikes. After the war, Labour attained full power, the social services were expanded and, with full employment and the nationalisation of the main industries, the unions found themselves in a stronger position than ever. There were fewer fundamental grievances in industry ; there was no general wave of heavy striking as there had been after 1918.

Yet the very growth and power of the unions, the recognition they had won from employers, and their many new-forged links with government produced new sources of uneasiness among their members. In several cases, but particularly in the docks (where, ironically enough, " workers' control " was nearest to being established), the men apparently felt they were losing control over their own organisations. " We go to see the boss," a docker was reported as saying in 1950, " and we find our own trade-union leader. We go to see our own trade-union official, and find the Government. We don't know where we are." The reorganisation of wages and working conditions involved by nationalisation produced a crop of new frictions, the number of strikes reached all-time maxima ; and, whether or not there were political agitators ready to take the lead, some important post-war strikes were as much acts of defiance against the unions' leadership as struggles for improvements. So, while the egalitarian policies of post-war governments must have helped to remove some of the older grievances, fresh determinants of strikes came to the surface. More recently, with a change of the Government's colour, a few of the older ones have been coming back.

But the significance of recent strikes should not be exaggerated, for most of them have been very small and short. The proportion of strikes lasting less than a week has risen pretty steadily for a long time : before 1914 it was about 45 per cent., but nowadays it is running almost 90 per cent. and up till quite recently almost half the recorded strikes have lasted less than

a day. Nor should one exaggerate the "loss," so-called, from strikes. The number of "working days lost" (or man-days idle) is a very crude indication of lost output – as crude as if one estimated air-raid damage by reference to the bomb-tonnage dropped, irrespective of target or type of bomb. But the reduction during my own lifetime has been very marked: during the second war for instance, the annual loss was well under half what it was in the first; and the loss in the two years after 1945 was less than a tenth of what it had been in the years after 1918. the corresponding period Except in 1957 and 1959, the loss of working time per worker employed in the main industries (the industries where the strikes took place) has probably never been as much as half-a-working-day per year since the early 'thirties, and has often been less than a fifth. If you take the loss as spread over the whole working population, it is infinitesimal – perhaps ma 0.1 per cent. of total production time.

In 1959, however (the year of the printers' strike) the, the total loss was the biggest since 1932; and in 1957 (the year of the engineers' and shipbuilders' strike) it was the biggest—forgetting the year of the General Strike since 1925. But even these reversions-to-type should be seen in proportion: in particular, they should be seen in proportion to "losses" from other causes. In 1925, nearly 9 million working days were lost in strikes; but bene- fit was paid out in respect of some 138 million days of sickness, and unemployment can hardly have accounted for less than 370 million days' loss. It may be argued that there is less sickness and certainly less unemployment today, and that for this reason alone the loss from strikes is more important. Also, that to average out the loss from strikes is misleadingly to average it out of existence; for, of course, the unpredictable shock effect of strikes will be felt more severely (it is, after all, meant to be felt) than the effects of the running-sore type of loss from sickness, absenteeism or unemployment. Certainly some abnormally big strikes such as the national coal strikes of 1912, 1921 and 1926 jolted the whole economy for a time. But in the past the economic effects (though not necessarily the social and political effects) of even the biggest strikes were short-lived: stocks had often been built up in anticipation, and the time lost was "really taken out of the time that employees would, have been idle in any case rather than out of production time. Indeed, as has been painted out before now, the question is wider even than this, since a strike may sometimes be socially and economically preferable, even if it does involve a certain loss, to a prolonged period of hostility, going slow or chronic apathy. I would stress this aspect, because it is not always a popular view. I attended a sociological congress some years ago at which the underlying assumption seemed to be that the total elimination of all conflict

was the highest good. I was (with one more far distinguished exception) a lone voice proclaiming that a society wholly without conflict was a dead society, and that was not to eliminate conflict but to harness or domesticate it so that it ceases to be purely destructive. However, this said, one must admit that the position regarding strikes today, when unemployment is much lower and stocks far smaller than were in the inter-war years, is very different from what it was ; and it would be frivolous to belittle big strikes. The moral is that the general economic context of strikes provides the most important weighting of any figures of time or output lost, and today a small strike in a key industry could have a more tripping effect than a big one would have had thirty or forty years ago.

It may also be argued that what happened before 1940 no longer applies anyway, since British workers have gained so much in bargaining power since then, and that therefore the very threat of a strike is now more cogent than ever. It is obvious that one cannot be really precise about the economic effects of strikes (any more than about their causes) ; but their character has evidently changed how could it fail to with the times. For some years after the War, strikes were less an instrument of union policy than, on occasion, a weapon of rebellion against union authority ; now, they are more an instrument of union policy and, on occasion, a weapon of rebellion against state authority. Socially, they still fulfil the function (in some ways an increasingly important function) of calling immediate attention to weaknesses in the working of the ever-more-complex machinery by which industry is regulated ; statistically, they provide a certain measure of the importance of these weaknesses and, more generally, of the distrust felt by industrial workers of the system of regulation as a whole. I am suggesting that, as things are, the possibility of strikes as we know them provides a useful safety-valve, a chance of canalising what might, if suppressed, turn out to be socially dangerous pressures I think it was this kind of consideration that won the unions the formal right to strike in the first is no inconsistency in advocating—as I imagine we all should—the elimination of their root causes so far as this can be done; it is where these causes cannot be eradicated that the possibility of striking remains important at the very lowest, as one of the better of many possible evils.

REFERENCE

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INTERNATIONAL LAW THE ULTIMATE TEST

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The true test of a legal system is the contribution it is able to make to the preservation of peace and order. If international is put to this ultimate test, essential differences between national and international law emerge. Where, on a world scale, is the law-making machinery comparable to that of a legislature in a civilised community? Where are the courts which give justice to anybody seeking their protection? Where, if international peace is threatened or broken, is the strong arm of the law, and, in the last resort, the government, wielding over-whelming legitimate force?

I.—THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

While, to some degree, law influences its social environment, it is this environment which primarily determines the basic character of the law. This explains the fundamental differences between mature legal systems of national law and international law. The former are the expression of a community will, and their functions are to check and co-ordinate diverging sectional or personal interests in the overriding interest of all. By way of contrast, the international law of unorganised or partly organised international societies, as they existed until the First World War, and of global confederations such as the League of Nations and United Nations remains subordinate to the rule of force or, at least, permits the most powerful of the members of such multipurpose institutions, at will, to contract out of the rule of law and to treat their own sectional interests as supreme. These international societies are systems of open power politics, as in the pre-1914 era, or of power politics in disguise, as in the post-1919 and post-1945 periods. Such temporary equilibrium as, for a time, exists, is a more or less sophisticated variant of the balance of power pattern. The Locarno period and the present thermonuclear balance of terror illustrate this proposition. It should, however, be added that these intervals between major wars also offer exceptional opportunities to break the vicious circles in which States forming parts of such systems are engulfed. What appears fallacious is to think of " conflicts " or " disputes " as such. What is decisive is the society or community character of the environments in which tensions exist.

II. —THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

In international societies in which power—openly or in disguise — reigns supreme, international law is primarily a *Law of*

Power, I.E., it serves the interests of power, a mean between influence and force . This type of law cannot seriously affect the continuum of mounting pressure that signifies the transition from peace to war. Throughout the ages, doctrines of the Just War have not primarily restrained sovereign princes from the use of force they intended to apply, but served to justify any forcible action they had decided to take. In other words, their freedom to go to war (*jus ad bellum*) was unlimited. Similarly, in the United Nations, the legality of resort to force on the part of a permanent member of the Security Council in the alleged exercise of its right of self-defence or collective defence against alleged armed attack remains unverifiable. The Korean War (1950-53) and the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 prove that such situations are not limited to armed conflicts in which permanent members of the Security Council are involved.

In the relations between States at peace with one another international law fulfils also functions of a Law of Reciprocity, but chiefly in spheres peripheral from the point of view of power politics, such as international diplomatic, economic and social relations. Paradoxical though it may seem, once states are at war with one another, the law of reciprocity may come into its own again in the laws and customs of war (*jus in bello*). They give some scope—yet only on the fringes of the play of force—to notions of chivalry and humanity.

What remains underdeveloped in such an environment is the third type of law : the Law of Co-ordination, typical of a community which employs law as a rational means of co-ordinating joint efforts towards commonly accepted goals.

III.—THE PEACE-CONSERVING FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

It never was the function of classic international law as it existed before 1914 to prevent even aggressive war. Even parties to Hague Convention III of 1907 on the Opening of Hostilities were merely bound to comply with certain forms in going to war with one another, and the pacific settlement of international disputes remained entirely optional. Pre-1914 international law achieved, however, at least one important distinction that is relevant in this context: the distinction between international war, the prerogative of sovereign States, and civil war, in principle a matter in the exclusively domestic sphere of every sovereign State.

It was left Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact to introduce into international law the distinction between legal and illegal war, a distinction widened in the Charter of the United Nations to that between the legal and illegal use of force. Under the law of the United Nations, the threat or use of force unless in self-defence or collective defence

against armed attack is illegal and, therefore, amounts to aggression – in the words of the Nuremberg international Tribunal, the supreme crime.

If the interests of the two super Powers are parallel as they were during the Anglo-French-Israeli Suez intervention of 1956, the United Nations gives the appearance of a working world order. Its machinery for the pacific settlement of international disputes then works reasonably well and it permits improvisations such as the United Nations Emergency Force. Even if the world powers merely impose self-denying ordinances on themselves, *ad hoc* action such as that of the United Nations in the Congo becomes possible. Yet, it requires shocks such as the Cuba crisis of 1962 to awake most of us from "progressive" day-dreaming to the grim realities of a divided world which is constantly in danger of suffering the penalties of having to rely on the shaky quasi-order of a mere world confederation.

The true character of this world balance system is revealed by the B (biological), C (chemical) and N (nuclear) weapons the World Powers are assembling against the contingency of the breakdown of politics and international institutions in the nuclear and space age. At this point, the legality or illegality of these weapons ceases to matter; for, in such an eventuality, both sides are resolved on employing these weapons of mass destruction and prepared to expose themselves and their foes to co-extirmination in a final orgy of mechanised barbarism. In this impasse, it appears that legal history, rather than international law as it stands, can make a decisive contribution to the problem of the prevention of war. Man's innate aggressive tendencies date back to Cain and, probably, long before his time. Even so, for ages there have been legal systems which, over prolonged periods, have effectively restrained the aggressive propensities of individuals and groups. How did they succeed in this? The most advanced of them were the end products of an evolution and division of functions which, in the beginning, were united in a strong, if not necessarily just, central authority, wielding overwhelming power. It was the centralised government that made it possible to create order, without which there cannot be justice, and which is the only antidote so far proved effective against war which is merely another word for anarchy.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NORMAL RELATIONS OF STATES

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Professor Schwarzenberger has told us about international law and war. I want, very briefly, to look at the other side of the coin and examine how far international law is serviceable for consolidating peace in a divided but shrinking and increasingly interdependent world. Now obviously this is too large a topic to tackle here so I want, with your permission, to refer to a very few points which seem specially relevant to the general theme of this conference. They will be very elementary and even obvious, because it's the elements we need to get right.

There are, of course, two very popular fallacies about international law. One is that it has no existence outside the minds of Professors of it. The other is that it exists indeed as a complete and seamless garment and that if only governments could be persuaded to obey or coerced into obeying it the millennium would have arrived. I have no doubt that it is the latter which is the more harmful to the cause of international law, if only because it tends to be shared by lawyers as well as laymen.

But the trouble with traditional international law was not so much that it was disobeyed but on the contrary that it touched the really important international issues hardly at all. Professor Schwarzenberger has shown how very recent an experiment is the attempt to provide procedures for the legal control of the use of force by states. The whole emphasis of traditional international law was upon the questions of formal intercourse between sovereign and independent states. A prime purpose of the law was to justify and sanction sovereignty and independence. It was the law that insisted that such vital matters as, for example, economic and financial policy, armament, immigration, nationality and a State's behaviour toward its own subjects – that all these matters were within the reserved domain of the sovereign discretion of each state. Perhaps the most striking example, however, is in the matter of taking disputes to an international court. One expects to find in any ordered society that a party to a dispute can have legal issues tested by a court. But when we consult even present day international law in this regard we find that the rule of law, constantly reiterated by authorities and by the courts themselves, is the negative one that no court or tribunal has any jurisdiction whatsoever over a sovereign state unless that state has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction. In short, the traditional basic stuff of international law reflects and sanctions precisely that individual-

- world of sovereign independent states that is so congenial an environment for the very disease we are studying how to control.

Now, of course, big changes are being wrought in the law and the pace of the changes has been accelerating over the past the decade. A great body of treaty law—the nearest thing we have to international legislation—is providing much of the stuff of a law suited to the needs of a society of interdependent states. International organisations have proliferated and become a familiar part of the everyday international scene, many of them possessing important powers in matters which even a short time ago would have been regarded as within the domestic, reserved domain of the separate states. The United Nations, with all its imperfections, provides both a law concerning the use or threat of force in international relations and some kind of machinery for political decision on the international plane, and, by no means least important, a third party on the international diplomatic scene. Though, of course, a vast amount remains to be done, it is fair to say that some important aspects of international law are being changed, developed and elaborated, at a pace and to a degree that even 15 years ago would have seemed visionary. And whole new branches have developed with astonishing rapidity e.g., concerning the resources of the continental shelf, which were themselves almost unknown before the last war, or over the conservation of the resources of the high seas ; or even over the exploration of space.

But it would be quite wrong to think of this as a steady progress, however limited. For if this law is in fact relevant at all to the tensions of a politically divided world, we would expect to find that the law itself reflects this struggle of cold war. And this is indeed so. It is in a way a rather two-edged testimony to the relevance of international law, and to the importance that is attached to it by Foreign Offices, that legal argument is so constant and important a part of those disputes which symptomize the struggle for power between east and west ; Berlin, the two Germanies ; what is the exact meaning of the " peaceful use " of outer space ; China and the U.N.

And it is not just that there are legal arguments going on about particular situations. Even the theoretical approach to the law faithfully reflects the division and the tension. Under the clever and attractive idea of " co-existence " the Soviet Union has elaborated a modified approach to the orthodox material international law. The Soviet Union tends in fact to speak terms of oi rather old-fashioned law. The insistence is on sovereignty and independence again an approach which for obvious reasons is not without its attraction also for those on the side-lines the unaligned and *newly* independent and sovereign

states) to take a very significant example, there is insistence on the old rule that an international court has no jurisdiction over a state without its consent, as being almost a insistence rule of natural law— and it is a fact that the Soviet Union not only will not give such consent not to any case before the World Court but is almost invariably opposed to jurisdiction clauses in treaties for referring questions of interpretation to the Court.

Similarly in the United Nation. The Soviet's approach is, in a way, a way, strait-laced and orthodox. It is to insist upon the sanctity of the original design of the Charter, where all power and competence in matters concerning international peace and security was concentrated in the Security Council effectively hobbled, of course, by the veto power. And to oppose attempts to evade the crippling effect of the veto by means of devices designed to give more power to the General Assembly where there is no veto. To oppose the growth of the diplomatic importance of the office of Secretary-General and of the Secretariat. To use the financial weapon of a refusal to pay her apportioned share of the expenses of the United Nations operations in Suez and the Congo, on the ground of their alleged "illegality" under the Charter.

And what of the West's approach to international law? We naturally think of it as simply representing the pure and unsullied main stream of international law. But to others no doubt it looks different. Some new, particularly ex-colonial states, think of our international law as being too European, and too Christian; too much shaped in the 19th century colonial period. And, of course, it is true that the United Nations has been an important instrument of United States policy on many occasions could only wish that our own determination in this to pursue our ends through the United Nations machinery had been half so evident.

But it is not my purpose in pointing out that the fracture of the society of states is reflected in corresponding fractures in the system of international law either to apportion blame or praise or to argue that this or that version is right or wrong. For this is only to aggravate the situation. It is simply to plead that we must keep always in mind that the only true international law is a *Universal* international law, and that nothing less will do. In the same way, the aim must be eventually to achieve a United Nations that is universal by reason that its membership will be compulsory. Thus stated, this may seem elementary to the point of being trite. Yet it is easily forgotten. Witness the present tragically misguided attempt on the part of African States to expel the Union of South from the International Labour Organization or from the United Nations. Of course, her apartheid are both a menace to peace in Africa and in the

rid are hateful to all right-minded persons. But is the remedy therefore, to remove the Union from the place where the pressures of opposition are able to exert their influence, and by the same stroke to exonerate the Union from those obligations to respect human rights which are enshrined in the Charter?

HOW TO RESTORE AND DEVELOP A UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LAW?

Clearly it can only come about alongside other developments mainly political. It is only lawyers who can imagine that peace can be achieved through law. But law is, as we have just heard from professor Schwarzenberger, so to speak, a necessary and important part of the treatment. If it is not sufficient alone, but neither can we go without it. And I want to end by suggesting that the ordinary layman can do quite a lot to help strengthen international law. It may be a question of small impact on a large problem ; but we must do what we can.

One hears a great deal of talk about the need for sanctions but the fact is that the strength of law depends so much just upon people knowing about it. As Maitland said many years ago, " taught law is tough law." Think how much the principles of the constitution of a state depend for their strength and resilience on citizens being aware of them and therefore probably caring for them. The same is true of international law.

Yet in this country our attitude towards international law is in many ways remarkably insular and complacent certainly not least in the legal profession itself. And a serious criticism I would have thought of the attitude of governments generally is that so much policy is based upon expedients, improvisations and short-term views, with little willingness or even means of considering moral and legal aspects of policy. This is dangerous even from the point of view of longer term expediency. And this is where informed public opinion can make itself felt to some purpose.

I do not mean, of course, that the layman can help—except in rare cases—by taking sides on legal questions. We are all familiar with the kind of short but trenchant letter to the Times asserting that such and such a course of action is illegal in a mttter which one knows the International Court of Justice would want many months to hear and consider and probably decide by a narrow majority. It is a fallacy to suppose there is always a legal answer anyway; there is more often a choice of possible directions and many legal decisions contain at least elements of policy.

But it is important that public opinion should insist that the legal aspects of international questions are relevant and import and must receive serious consideration. In this way public

opinion can do immense good. Let me take one or two examples where the lay opinion can do much.

Some few years ago the British Foreign Office — for understandable reasons of short-term policy—invented a variation on bad American theme concerning reservations to their acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was I think at least partly pressure of public opinion, organised for example, through the Churches, that resulted later in some modification of this reservation though not in its complete withdrawal.

Or take an issue which perhaps ought to be considered at the moment. There is a case against the U.K. pending in the International Court of Justice concerning our administration of the Cameroons Mandate. It is common form for the defendant in any case before that Court to try first the defence that the Court has no jurisdiction in the case ; which, of course, depends upon whether the defendant has or has not himself at some time consented to the exercise of the jurisdiction. The British Government has naturally and expectedly entered such a plea against the jurisdiction, which may be well-founded. But we also probably have a good case on the merits. Is it right and even on a larger view expedient to seek to avoid an impartial judgement in a case where we believe we have a good case? I am not sure. But I am sure the alternative will hardly have been considered. And informed public opinion ought to ask this question.

Or again—this country is a party, of course, to the European Convention on Human Rights. But it has not followed the example of several other countries of accepting either the right of individuals to bring petitions to the Commission of Human Rights or in accepting the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights — though the President of that Court is our chairman this morning. Why do we not accept these obligations, that put teeth into a convention to which we are already a party? (And affairs like Crichton Down have surely demonstrated that it is time we abandoned our traditionally smug attitude towards human rights in this country?) The question was asked in Parliament and received a technical reply calculated to deceive anybody except any international lawyer. But the real reason is inertia, and the fact that to a quite small extent it might from time to time be a nuisance to the administration. Nobody wants it enough to push. Few people even knew about it. And, of course, it is not " news."

So the problem is partly at least one of communication. If we can get the layman not the man in the street but the influential layman whose opinion matters, to be aware quite generally of the nature of international law and its relevance, and to ask what the legal issues are in any situation and to insist

they are seen to be reflected in the policy decision that is that is made, we shall have gone a long way to strengthening international law. Indeed, if we could persuade the *Times* to give the same prominence to a judgement of the International Court of Justice as it does to the trial of some petty and transient case in our own courts, we should have taken a step in the right direction.

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CONCLUDING ADDRESS

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I am greatly honoured to have been invited to give this concluding address, and to sum up, as it were, this Third Conference on the Pathogenesis of War.

It is not an easy task, but on the other hand a rewarding one, and may I straight away express what is in the minds of us all — and will long remain in our minds namely, the astonishing success of this occasion.

Rarely have I attended a meeting of this or indeed of any other kind, where the standard and quality of the communications has been so uniformly high. Communications not only factual, penetrating, or provocative, but also often moving and inspiring. All of this, I believe, augurs well for the future of our Association and its work, and reflects the greatest credit upon all responsible for the organisation of this particular Conference. And let us pause in thankfulness to those who founded our Association in times and conditions of greatest difficulty often of opposition and even abuse. They were pioneers, of course not the earliest pioneers, but the successors of a line extending back to Comenius, and in the last and this century to Pasteur, Virchow, Pavlov and Wilfred Trotter. These early pioneers failed—they were glorious failures but we as their successors must surely succeed.

It is only a few years since doubts were cast on the need for the very existence of our Association, and on its useful prospects. But these doubts are now removed. We see the need more urgently than ever before, and we are fortified, by the increasing success and appreciation of our work in the last three years especially—due in large measure to these annual Conferences in Oxford and Cambridge, and to our recent publication. It is, I believe, an earnest of our purpose, that so many individuals, with so many other commitments, have arranged to come here, at their own expense in time and financially, to make what contribution they can. Some encouragement is richly deserved, and again we see a sign of it, in the remarkable leading article of the *Times Literary Supplement* of Friday last.

Upon our arrival in Selwyn we were greatly heartened by Dorman Macdonald's introductory address, when he rightly stressed the inter and multi-disciplinary approach which we find it essential to adopt—as in every kind of modern research—embracing not only medicine in its largest sense, but also the para-medical sciences, the fundamental sciences with economics, sciences, sociology, administration and law.

It has always seemed to me the vast human tragedy, that devastating wars should have descended upon us with so little reaction, or often no reaction, on the part of the world of learning, or from the spheres of literature, the arts and music, and indeed, above all, of religion, which otherwise we might have expected to be unifying and preventive. But through such efforts as those of our Association, and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and many other related movements, I believe this is passing. Without arrogance we now see, as only a few saw previously, the special responsibility of science and medicine. Their strength rests in their essential internationality not quite to be found in any other human endeavour. There are many religions, but there is only one science, and only one medicine. Holding out uniquely the prospects of a more rational solution, even more through medicine they urge the claims of common humanity.

As an experimental pathologist and cell biologist, at these Conferences it does me good to be exposed to so much of modern psychological, psychiatric and behavioural science—even to its jargon—but seriously I have never been in the least doubt, that our main problem is the dissipation of that international fear and distrust — often totally illogical and irrational — in the presence of which all treaties are vain, and in the absence of which, treaties are no longer necessary.

Our proceedings proper yesterday morning opened auspiciously indeed happily—with a most impressive paper by Mr. Evans of the Institute of Education—one which we shall long remember, and which you acknowledged with special acclaim. He again properly emphasized the cross-disciplinary approach so necessary also in education, anthropology and social psychology. On the other side of the picture, the contrary external forces operating against the teacher, in faulty cultural patterns, and in the misuse of mass media. If T may paraphrase him, to be is to struggle, and the need for glory—which in some manner we must express or sublimate—still exists. And finally we thank him for his optimism.

Peter Cooper on attitudes towards war and education, gave us a critical if in some ways pessimistic account—greatly lightened by a most amusing analysis of the educational history—or the lack of it—of our representatives in Parliament. To me this seemed once more to raise the need for some greater representation of science and medicine in the Commons. And at the risk of appearing out-of-date and old-fashioned, may I raise an issue which I admit appears to be dead—namely, that of University representation. University representation was abolished by the Socialists. The Tories then solemnly undertook if re-elected to restore it. But they failed to do so—a cynical if typical betrayal.

I am utterly opposed to the previously existing double vote. But I would support an alternative vote, enabling a man to cast his choice either in his domestic constituency or in the University sphere. The device of University representation ensured the presence in Parliament of fifteen or twenty men or women of exceptional ability and true independence. I am convinced the country has suffered much from its abolition, and that the history of its abolition casts much shame on both the Labour and Conservative Parties.

Cooper also raised what I thought was one of the key issues of this Conference, in his claim that understanding and knowledge of our neighbours, does not always or necessarily, or indeed often, lead to love. In many cases this may be unquestionably true. It is true that student interchange does not always lead to enhanced understanding. But I would strenuously oppose the implicit pessimism, having on many occasions seen at very close quarters, the profound international betterment which can arise from such international contact.

I quote but two examples. There is profound ignorance in this country of the U.S.S.R. and of Japan, and of the rapid changes taking place in these countries—changes which can be appreciated only by frequent contact.

1. I have been in Russia three times in the past three years. My main impression of " The Russians " is that there are no such things, there are 200 races all with intense humanity and longing, and there is the very vital younger generation.
2. In Japan the main initiators of the War were the War Lords, almost mediaeval in outlook, and there still remain extremists of the left and right. But the views of the immense intervening majority appear to be very different indeed.

I shall mention this question later, but in the present Conference my own view was, I think, supported by Professor Roth, who did not agree that communication and understanding make a situation worse; and by Dr. Parfitt in his quotation, " Tout savoir, tout comprendre, est tout pardonner."

Frank Dawtry's paper, as Secretary of the National Association of Probation Officers, on non-violent methods of treating crime, surely was a memorable example of human, humane, and—in spite of his modesty—of scientific understanding. He started with some simple but startling statistics, that while one murder is committed every hour in the United States, one murder occurs only every 2½ days in the U.K., during which time 150 persons are killed on the roads. He rightly drew attention to the exaggeration of crime. To a large extent this is due to

the Press, and without in the least desiring to restrict the liberty of the Press, we do pray that the efforts of the Press Council may increasingly be bent towards this problem.

We must all have been greatly affected by Mr. Dawtry's approach to the treatment of weak and frustrated people, of those whose sole crime is their inability to cope with life.

When I was working in Hull Prison in 1929 I could only think of the prisoners as patients.

And let us remember that it was his visits to the prisoners of Rome, soon after his election, which revealed a new quality of the Papacy of the late Pope John — a gesture which moved the entire world, which had no relation to organised religion or theology, but which sprang from a human heart, in part inspired by the fact that one of his own immediate family had also been a prisoner.

In his paper, Mr. Dawtry gave us due cause for pride in our own country, in his mention of the Probation of Offenders' Act of as long ago as 1907, with its injunction "to befriend", was particularly apt.

Mr. Dawtry made no claim to be scientific, but only to have a "hunch." But what a hunch it was!

From Dr. Allchin we had a paper of exceptional intelligence and sensitivity. I remember his quotation from a letter from one of his patients "I can't stand being taken as a figure of no account." Here perhaps is the very crux of all our problems. He showed how any discussion of psychopathology tends to become a discussion of social conditions, he traced the evolution of the street gang, and the submergence of reason, and he correlated individual psychopathology with its infiltration of and interlocking with, the social and international situation.

All these papers drew attention to the relationship between psychosis, delinquency and war, and a further parallel might appear in the realm of industrial conflict. Mr. Knowles gave a fascinating analytical account of the natural history of strikes, like war, indications of discontent and resentment, like war often the last resort, but on the contrary nowadays usually with little violence. Obviously strikes, whether in the mines, the docks, the railways, the textile or the automobile industries, have their roots in political organisation and social structure. And he analysed the categories of causation—immediate, conditional, and underlying—in such factors as wages, solidarity, the trade cycle, seasonal fluctuations, war, •the decline in pride in work, the lessened significance of the individual, the isolation of the man and wife, delays in national bargaining, and conflict of owner-workers' interests. For our purpose, what is significant is that in some these induce feelings of isolation and inferiority compensation. And the value of his counsel lay in the elimination

of root causes where this is possible, and in the harnessing of conflict where we cannot entirely remove it.

Dr. Fisher also drew a compelling parallel between industrial conflict and the problem of the prevention of nuclear war - in their irrationality, the primitiveness of the emotional basis of the clash, and the panic and hatred. And we were grateful to him for his advocacy and defence of the role of the doctor in industry as an independent observer.

But the parallelism between the pathogenesis of war and of industrial conflict is not so immediate or complete as in other fields. As Chairman, Dr. Stewart posed the question, " What is the prospect of winning " The answer is that while it may still be possible to win a strike, it is no longer possible to win a war. Following an equally penetrating question by Dr. Franks, we may still regard strikes as a safety valve, but we cannot and will not so regard even so-called small wars.

Perhaps the very nucleus was struck by Professor Carstairs' discussion of a substitute for patriotism. In his words, in the present century we sense a widening of fellow-feeling, a tendency to the subjugation of self-interest, a ripening for our community to embrace the whole world, To my own mind this can only lead to an evolution towards a Parliament of the World, of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I believe in World Government, but only in the sense of the late Lord Beveridge. Lord Beveridge knew that most men are unhappy enough with one Government, and do not desire two. But we wish the World Government to have only one power, namely, to withdraw from national governments the capacity to prosecute national war. I see no conflict here with the current outburst of African and Asian nationalism. We have our own nationalism, our own patriotism, and I believe profoundly that there is a British contribution still to be made, without which the world will be a sadder place. With Patrick Armstrong I entirely agree, that a very role and function of World Government should be not to destroy but to preserve, national variety and patriotism.

In discussion, Dr. Rycroft alluded to the Freudian dilemma, whether aggression is instinctive or a response to threat. I am certain it is both, and with Dr. Fisher and Dr. Macdonald I believe it must be directed not against the out-group but against the out-idea, of war and overt It is not a matter of nobility but of practical sense and survival, when we advocate that foreign policies must in time be positively directed, to the good of other nations.

If I had any criticism to direct against the present Conference, I should say in spite of its excellence it was perhaps in some ways too theoretical. And many members have expressed to me their anxiety, what could they do in a practical way? As

to the answer I have no doubt. It resides in the encouragement of international exchange of personnel, in science and medicine and every other sphere of human activity. War between this country and Germany twice in the present century appears to me fantastic, and could only have been possible from the essential nullity of contact between the liberal elements of both. I should therefore wish to see in the years ahead, a dramatic increase in movement between each country and every other. Great progress has been made, but the signal defect is between this country and the U.S. on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and China on the other. The Chinese difficulty I regard as by far the most serious and menacing in the world today. Their present behaviour is altogether out of character with Chinese civilisation and tradition, but in many ways comprehensible from the treatment to which they have been subjected. And although they are themselves by no means without fault, nonetheless, I believe our main efforts should be devoted to bringing them within the fabric of the United Nations.

In conclusion, may I thank you for your patience and kindness.

It is my pleasant duty to express our gratitude to all who have made this Conference such a resounding success, especially to the Conference Secretary, Mrs. Edwards, the members of the Committee, particularly Dr. Alice Roughton (for her generous hospitality), to all our contributors and our Chairmen, and lastly, but by no means least, to the Master and authorities of Selwyn College.

Through these efforts we are not ashamed, but are sensible, of having made a contribution towards the understanding of the nature and pathogenesis of war, and to the cause of peace.

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